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ABSTRACT  
THREE ESSAYS ON EXTREMELY COMPETITIVE MARKETS:  
INSIGHTS FROM MOBILE APPS MARKET   
by 
Ruijiao Guo 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2015 
Under the Supervision of Professor Purushottam Papatla 
 
Some products and services today compete against hundreds or thousands of 
competitors. Faced with so much competition, developers offer their products and 
services for free, or at a very low price, to those who are interested in the hope of 
attracting a large group of users. We label such markets where producers give products 
away for free or charge a nominal price as extremely competitive markets. Businesses 
competing in extremely competitive markets need insights regarding how they can 
increase the interest in, and use of, their products by potential customers. Unfortunately, 
the literature provides few such insights. This is the gap that I address in this dissertation 
research using the mobile app category with a specific focus on three questions: (1) what 
factors affect the number of users who download an app (2) why do some apps generate 
more interest among their users in terms of the word of mouth that they generate than 
other apps and (3) why do some apps acquire users faster than other apps?  
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In the first essay, I propose and empirically verify an implicit assumption to explain 
why businesses in extremely competitive market charge a zero or a very low price.   The 
assumption is that a product with a large group of users will generate profits in the future 
through one or more mechanisms.   For instance, the large user group could attract 
advertisers interested in targeting the users with promotions for their products. 
Alternatively, it may create network effects which could, in turn, increase the willingness 
of users to buy the product. Finally, a free product with a large user group may increase 
the developer’s ability to target the users with improved versions of that product, or other 
related new products, at a positive price.   Findings from our investigation for essay I on 
the factors that affect the number of users who download an app suggest that the extent 
of interest of users in other apps offered by the developer has a significant positive effect 
on the ability of a currently offered app to attract users. Not surprisingly, charging a price 
rather than giving it away reduces the number of users and so does an increase in the 
app’s physical size, i.e., the memory that it requires on the phone. In terms of the app’s 
rating, interestingly, we find that apps that either have a low-maturity rating – meaning 
that they are approved for children as well – or have a high-maturity rating – meaning 
that their use by kids is not advised – do well in terms of the number of users they attract.   
Our findings also suggest that apps from some genres such as brain teasers, arcade games 
and sports gain more users than others.   Competition-wise, we find that conversations 
among users who installed competing apps attract more users for the app while an 
increase in the price of competing apps that were installed reduces the number of users 
that an app attracts.   Overall, therefore, our results suggest that developers with more 
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experience and awareness among users can attract users more easily for new apps than 
those with no prior experience thus providing empirical support for one of the three 
mechanisms that the app industry seems to assume. While they are from one category 
that involves extreme competition, our results may also apply to other categories such as 
video channels and blogs in similar markets. 
From the first essay, we find that users’ discussion of apps developed by a certain 
developer will help in acquiring users for their future products.   In the second essay, 
therefore, we investigate the issue of the factors that affect consumers’ word-of- mouth 
for apps.   Our analysis of the word of mouth for apps also provides some surprising 
insights into why users discuss some apps more than others.   Specifically, we find that 
users are more likely to post comments, reviews, and discuss apps that they paid for 
rather than those that they obtained for free. This is clearly a finding with significant 
implications for the pricing and promotion of apps: apps that are given away are less likely 
to attract users who are advocates that are willing to promote them to potential users.   
Developers of apps therefore need to take this into account in their pricing decisions.  In 
addition to this immediate implication for the app category, our finding also raises the 
possibility that, in general, consumers are more likely to discuss products that they 
purchased than those that they received as promotional items. Other findings and 
managerial implications are discussed.  
In the third essay, I aim to jointly analyze the customer acquisition reached and the time 
to get there using a joint ordinal-survival analysis model. The focus in this research is on 
why, in the face of such extreme competition, some apps acquire customers faster than 
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others.   I investigate this question using data on the number of users acquired, and the 
acquisition growth, for about 2455 Apps from Google Play. I categorize the number of 
users acquired into ordered tiers and formulate a joint model of growth and customer 
acquisition using a survival model for the former and an ordinal logit model for the later.  
The explanatory variables include price, valence of customer rating, and other product 
attributes. Additionally, effects of competitive contexts and frames are considered.  I also 
consider the role of information cascades on customer acquisition and growth in 
extremely competitive markets.  The model is calibrated within a Bayesian framework 
using MCMC methods.  Findings for the app category as well as generalizable implications 
for extremely competitive markets are discussed.    
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I. Introduction 
Some products and services today compete against hundreds or thousands of 
competitors. Faced with so much competition, developers offer their products and 
services for free, or at a very low price, to those who are interested, in the hope of 
attracting a large group of users. We label such markets where producers give products 
away for free or charge a nominal price as extremely competitive markets. Businesses 
competing in extremely competitive markets need insights regarding how they can 
increase the interest in, and use of, their products by potential customers. Unfortunately, 
the literature provides few such insights. This is the gap that I address in this dissertation 
research using the mobile app category with a specific focus on three questions: (1) what 
factors affect the number of users who download an app (2) why do some apps generate 
more interest among their users in terms of the word of mouth that they generate than 
other apps and (3) why do some apps acquire users faster than other apps?  
In the first essay, I propose and empirically verify an implicit assumption to explain 
why businesses in extremely competitive markets charge a zero or a very low price.   The 
assumption is that a product with a large group of users will generate profits in the future 
through one or more mechanisms.   For instance, the large user group could attract 
advertisers interested in targeting the users with promotions for their products. 
Alternatively, it may create network effects which could, in turn, increase the willingness 
of users to buy the product. Finally, a free product with a large user group may increase 
the developer’s ability to target the users with improved versions of that product, or other 
related new products, at a positive price.   Findings from our investigation for essay I on 
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the factors that affect the number of users who download an app, suggest that the extent 
of interest of users in other apps offered by the developer has a significant positive effect 
on the ability of a currently offered app to attract users. Not surprisingly, charging a price 
rather than giving it away reduces the number of users and so does an increase in the 
app’s physical size, i.e., the memory that it requires on the phone. In terms of the app’s 
rating, interestingly, we find that apps that either have a low-maturity rating – meaning 
that they are approved for children as well – or have a high-maturity rating – meaning 
that their use by kids is not advised – do well in terms of the number of users they attract.   
Our findings also suggest that apps from some genres such as brain teasers, arcade games 
and sports gain more users than others.   Competition-wise, we find that conversations 
among users who installed competing apps attract more users for the app while an 
increase in the price of competing apps that were installed reduces the number of users 
that an app attracts.   Overall, therefore, our results suggest that developers with more 
experience and awareness among users can attract users more easily for new apps than 
those with no prior experience thus providing empirical support for one of the three 
mechanisms that the app industry seems to assume. While they are from one category 
that involves extreme competition, our results may also apply to other categories such as 
video channels and blogs in similar markets. 
From the first essay, we find that users’ discussion of apps developed by a certain 
developer will help in acquiring users for their future products.   In the second essay, 
therefore, we investigate the factors that affect consumers’ word-of- mouth for apps.   
This analysis as well provides some surprising insights into why users discuss some apps 
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more than others.   Specifically, we find that users are more likely to post comments, 
reviews, and discuss apps that they paid for rather than those that they obtained for free. 
This is clearly a finding with significant implications for the pricing and promotion of apps: 
apps that are given away are less likely to attract users who are advocates that are willing 
to promote them to potential users.   Producers of apps therefore need to take this into 
account in their pricing decisions.  In addition to this immediate implication for the app 
category, our finding also raises the possibility that, in general, consumers are more likely 
to discuss products that they purchased than those that they received as promotional 
items. Other findings and managerial implications are discussed.  
In the third essay, I aim to jointly analyze the customer acquisition reached and the time 
to get there using a joint ordinal-survival analysis model. The focus in this research is on 
why, in the face of such extreme competition, some apps acquire customers faster than 
others.   I investigate this question using data on the number of users acquired, and the 
acquisition duration, for about 2455 Apps from Google Play. I categorize the number of 
users acquired into ordered tiers and formulate a joint model of growth and customer 
acquisition using a survival model for the former and an ordinal logit model for the later.  
The explanatory variables include price, valence of customer rating, and other product 
attributes. Additionally, effects of competitive contexts and frames are considered.  I also 
consider the role of information cascades on customer acquisition and growth in 
extremely competitive markets.  The model is calibrated within a Bayesian framework 
using MCMC methods.  Findings for the app category as well as generalizable implications 
for extremely competitive markets are discussed.    
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II. Modeling the Installation Base of Mobile Applications in the 
Context of Extreme Competition 
 
Abstract 
In a marketplace characterized by myriad choices and intense competition, such as the 
mobile app market, getting consumers to discover and purchase products are probably 
the biggest challenges facing marketers today.  The present study labels such markets as 
“extremely competitive markets” and aims to uncover the implicit assumptions of the 
business strategies adopted by marketers in such markets.   To achieve the goal, I collect 
a large dataset from the highly popular mobile app store, googleplay.com, and empirically 
test the assumptions.   Given the nature of the response variable in my data, I rely on the 
Ordinal Logit Model for my analysis but, to capture the effects of unobserved 
heterogeneity of developers, I use a hierarchical specification and calibrate the model in 
the Bayesian Paradigm.   My findings suggest that the extent of interest of users in other 
apps offered by the same developer has a significant positive effect on the ability of a 
currently offered app to attract users.  My empirical results also provide additional 
insights regarding the marketing of apps in particular and about extremely competitive 
markets in general.  I therefore discuss the managerial implications of my findings and 
also provide directions for future research.  
Key Words:   Mobile Apps;   Extreme Competition;   Hierarchical Ordinal Logit Model; 
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2.1 Introduction 
Some products and services today compete against hundreds or thousands of 
competitors.  For instance, there are more than 1 million apps for products running on 
the Android platform1, 900,000 apps are available for Apple’s operating system iOS2, and 
millions of video channels on YouTube compete for viewers3.   The competition in other 
similar markets, such as online Blogs and online radio services, is also intense.   Faced with 
so much competition, marketers usually offer their products and services for free, or at a 
very low price (for instance, many apps are sold for 99 cents), to those who are interested 
in the hope of attracting a large group of users.   
Markets such as those above would typically be labeled as perfectly competitive 
markets.   The literature in economics has a long and rich history of research on perfectly 
competitive markets (Chamberlain 1933; Robinson 1934; Coase 1937; Stigler 1957; Fama 
1972; Wilson 1977; Allen and Hellwig 1986).   Robinson (1934) defined perfect 
competition as “a state of affairs in which the demand for the output of an individual 
seller is perfectly elastic”.  Such markets are characterized by low or no barriers to entry 
of competitors.   Many other conditions must be fulfilled for a market to be viewed as 
perfectly competitive.    First, identical products by different competitors must be sold 
simultaneously at the same price across all segments of the market.   Second, the number 
of firms must be large enough such that when any one firm alters its price there is no 
                                                          
1 On July 24th, 2013, Google Play store officially reached over 1 million apps.  
2 On June, 2013, Apple CEO Tim Cook revealed that there is now 900,0000 apps available in the iOS Apple 
Store, and that 375,000 of those apps are tailored made to support the iPad.  
3 According to YouTube Statistics, 100 hours of video are uploaded to YouTube every minutes: 
http://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html 
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consequent alteration of the prices charged by the others.   Third, the number of buyers 
should be large enough and have similar preferences.   Thus, consumers in perfectly 
competitive markets would be able to get the product from any of the many competitors 
at the price set by the market.    
Given the emergence of online markets, which are viewed as mirroring perfect 
competition, marketing scholars have also extensively investigated  whether online 
markets are highly competitive (Lal and Sarvary 1999; Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000; Pan, 
Shankar and Ratchford 2002; Pan, Ratchford and Shankar 2004; Ratchford 2009).   Most 
of this literature can be organized into two streams: analytical work focusing on 
characterizing and, analytically predicting, the behavior of competitors and empirical 
research investigating whether the behavior of prices in perfectly competitive markets is 
consistent with theoretical predictions, i.e., being uniform across all competitors.    
Results from the analytical studies suggest that the unique characteristics of the Internet 
will bring about a nearly perfect market because: (1) Consumers are fully informed of 
prices and product offerings and (2) The physical location of the Internet marketers is 
irrelevant.   Interestingly, some analytical models suggest that the emergence of perfect 
markets may, in fact, lead to counter-intuitive behavior.  For instance, Lal and Sarvary 
(1999) find that online price sensitivity could be lower in the online market4 when some 
of conditions are met.     
                                                          
4 Conditions include: (1) there is large enough pool of Internet shoppers; (2) Non-digital attributes are 
important but not overwhelming; (3) Consumers have a more favorable prior about the brand they 
currently own; (4) The fixed cost of a shopping trip is higher than the cost of visiting an additional store.  
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The findings of empirical studies on perfect competition are mixed.  For instance, 
Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) find that online prices are lower than those products sold 
in conventional channels, providing some evidence of competition in the Internet market.    
However, a number of other studies suggest that prices even in perfectly competitive 
markets are dispersed and do not exhibit uniformity across players in the market 
(Ratchford et al 2002; Pan et al 2004).  It appears that greater information flow and easier 
entry facilitated by the Internet has not made online markets more competitive and 
“frictionless” as predicted by theory.   Their explanation is that the Internet market is 
immature and lacks a stable equilibrium in market prices.    
The present research makes three contributions to the literature.    The first is that 
we go beyond the conventional notion of perfection competition and propose the new 
concept of extreme competition.  We believe this is an important distinction since, 
according to conventional wisdom, marketers in a perfectly competitive markets will at 
least earn normal profits, i.e., the profits which can cover the marginal cost (Robinson 
1934).  An extremely competitive market, however, is one that meets the aforementioned 
typical characteristics of a market with perfect competition, such as a large number of 
competitors, low entry barriers, and nearly uniform prices, but is characterized by 
competitor behavior that is atypical of markets regardless of whether they are perfectly 
competitive or not.   Specifically, while competitors in perfectly competitive markets exit 
when their marginal revenues fall below marginal costs, those in extremely competitive 
markets continue to operate.   Recent examples of such markets include online music 
services (such as Pandora.com and last.fm), online news services (e.g., oldreader.com) 
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and content providers to video services such as Youtube.com (e.g., content provider 
allthatglitters21 for Youtube.com) and mobile applications (e.g., the app Spotify 5  on 
Apple’s App Store).     
Our second contribution is that we examine a competitive strategy followed by 
most players in extremely competitive markets and provide empirical insights into 
whether it is meaningful.    Specifically, an implicit assumption of businesses in extremely 
competitive markets seems to be that continuing to provide the product to customers, 
even when the marginal costs are higher than marginal revenue, will eventually lead to 
positive profits through one or more processes.  For example, a product that acquires 
more customers will benefit from network effects leading to greater value of the product 
and, attract even more users.  Thus, for instance, all users of Pandora.com may benefit as 
more users use the service and rate the music they are listening to thus making it easier 
for all users to identify music that is liked by more users and, hence, is likely to be of better 
quality.  Another example is that a product that acquires more users is likely to help other 
products offered by the firm gain those customers as well due to their familiarity with the 
firm6.  Interestingly, however, there are few empirical investigations of whether these 
processes do occur.  Our research fills this gap.   
                                                          
5 Spotify’s lost $57 million in 2011 based on their report, despite a big increase in revenue, to $236 
million. Because they pay a majority of their revenue to music companies. The New York Times, “Pandora 
and Spotify Rake in the Money and then Send it Off in Royalties”, August 24th, 2014: 
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/24/pandora-and-spotify-rake-in-the-money-and-then-
send-it-off-in-royalties/  
6 In the case of both routes above, the likelihood of firms eventually realizing profits is likely to increase 
with the increase in the number of users of their products.   
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Another noticeable gap both in the economics and marketing literatures is that 
most research on electronic retailing (Mathwick, Malhotra, and Rigdon 2002; Menon and 
Kahn 2002; Wallace, Giese, and Johnson 2004; Laroche et al 2005; Yadav and Varadarajan 
2005) is limited to cases where the markets mimic the competitive characteristics of 
traditional brick-and-mortar markets while operating in the online channel.  The 
competition in such markets, therefore, is neither perfect nor extreme. There are 
therefore no normative insights on how competitors can compete and/or grow in 
extremely competitive markets.  Beginning to address this gap is the third contribution of 
this research. 
Our investigation is based on an analysis of data from 2422 apps for the Android 
platform using a Hierarchical Bayesian ordinal model. The factors that we consider 
include: (1) characteristics of the app such as its price, how much space it requires on a 
user’s phone, its genre and rating, (2) extent of interest of users in other apps offered by 
the developer, (3) experience of the developer with apps (4) promotional support for the 
app if any, and (5) extent and type of competition for the app in terms of the availability 
of similar apps and their performance in the market.   Findings from our investigation 
suggest that developers with more experience and awareness among users can attract 
users more easily for new apps than those with no other experience thus providing 
empirical support for the second process assumed behind the practice of giving products 
away for free or at a very low price by firms.  
In the next section, I present and discuss a number of streams of previous 
literatures related to our research. Following this, I describe the data. I then present the 
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empirical approach and results and conclude with a section where I discuss the 
managerial and research implications of my empirical findings.  
2.2 Literature Review 
The objective of my research is to empirically investigate the factors that affect success 
in extremely competitive markets with the mobile app category as my empirical context. 
I therefore present some findings in the literature on competition and, where relevant, 
on the mobile app category.  
Perfect Competition 
From the perspectives of classical and neoclassical economists, markets with perfect 
competition are basically viewed as transaction arenas in which the sellers are not only 
numerous but interchangeable entities (Remond 2013).    In such markets, firms cannot 
exert any influence on other players, since: (1) the influence of the product of any one 
firm upon the price is negligible; (2) The output of any one firm is negligible as compared 
with the total output; (3) Each firm decides the quantity of production without regard to 
the effect of its decision on the conduct of its competitors (Stigler 1957).   
The mobile app market has many of the above characteristics of perfect 
competition.  The market is characterized by myriad choices offering at very low prices 
(Racherla, Furner, and Babb, 2012).   Additionally, developers may release similar apps in 
the market at almost the same time and thus compete for users intensely. Some 
applications may even share the same title and have exactly the same functionalities and 
benefits while other similar applications may include some additional feature to gain a 
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competitive advantage.   For instance, the application, Temple Run, which was originally 
developed by IMANGI STUDIOS, has gained much popularity among users. Consequently, 
similar applications of Temple Run developed by other developers, such as Disney, are 
burgeoning. Developers in this market, therefore, take their strategic decisions without 
concern about the effects of their actions on how competitors may react.  However, a set 
of similar options offered at very low prices by competitors may take the shares away 
from the firm, whom then have difficulties to monetize its products.  
Thus, although competition in the mobile app category has many of the 
characteristics of perfect competition, it has its own characteristics which make it even 
more competitive.  First, a myriad of options without brand reputation leads to low 
customer loyalty although loyalty is key to success for online businesses (Reichheld and 
Schefter 2000; Urban et al 2000).  Second, given the experiential nature of the category, 
and the similarity of competitive offerings, consumers may have difficulties to assess the 
differences before, or even after, they actually experience the products (Dev and Lahiri 
2012).  This means that firms cannot rely on product differentiation as a competitive 
advantage as in traditional markets.   Third, since information search is facilitated by the 
digital nature of the products, consumers have very low search costs and can easily 
compare prices and attributes of different offerings (Pitt et al 2001).  Thus, advertising 
ceases to play the informative role that it typically does (Nelson 1970) and, hence, firms 
cannot use it to compete.  Fourth, customers face very low switching costs since 
competitors are generally only a “click away”(Fabio Ancarani 2002).  It is these four 
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characteristics that force marketers to offer their product at a very low price or even give 
their product for free.   
Another important characteristic of the mobile app market is that due to their 
digital nature, product attributes can be easily communicated online (Lal and Sarvary 
1999).   This, combined with the fact that there are a myriad of options for every type of 
app, results in an information overload for consumers leading them to rely on the 
opinions of other consumers to understand different offerings and select one that is most 
appropriate for them.  One of our objectives, therefore, is to examine whether the 
presence of competitors and word of mouth for them affects the acquisition of customers 
by an app.   
Effects of Other Apps   
Another objective of the present study is to verify an implicit assumption of businesses in 
extremely competitive markets, i.e., that other apps offered by the same developer would 
result in network effects and eventually help the business in acquiring more users for  new 
products that they introduce.  The network effects may be realized through one or more 
routes: (1) the users of other products may possibly became the users of the new product 
directly (2) the business may gain more experience and skills by developing multiple 
products and thus increase the user base for their future product (3) current users of the 
business may spread word-of-mouth which may help other products offered by the firm 
gain customers.   In the case of the three routes above, the network effects may 
eventually help the firms in acquiring more users for their new products.  
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Some literature in marketing has indeed investigated the influence of consumer 
networks on the adoption of products (Bass 1969; Robinson and Lakhani 1975, Kalish 
1983   However, the markets they explore are typically oligopolistic (Mahajan, Muller, and 
Bass 1990).   In addition, few studies have explored how firms should manage and 
strategically influence their customer networks to benefit from them (Godes et al. 2005).   
Recent studies began to opening this path, focusing primarily on firm’s strategies and 
opportunities to tap into online WOM effects.   Dellarocas (2006) inspects how strategic 
manipulation of online forums can shift the information value of online reviews for 
customers.   Chen and Xie (2009) explore how firms can benefit from establishing an 
online community where consumers can post reviews.   Similarly, Forman et al. (2008) 
empirically demonstrate that encouraging reviewers to disclose their identity can 
increase consumer trust in the reviews and, in turn, increase product sales.    Some of the 
other studies in this stream are: (1) Godes and Mayzlin (2009) empirically study how firms 
should strategically recruit customers for WOM campaigns to increase sales (2) Aral and 
Walker (2011) who highlight the effectiveness of viral product features in generating 
social contagion (3) Dou, Niculescu, and Wu (2012) who demonstrate analytically that 
increasing the strength of network effects can impact the adoption software products.    
Based on previous literature, we, therefore, expect that, in extremely competitive 
markets, the number of customers acquired by a product has a significant effect not only 
on its success but on that of other related products by the same manufacture due to 
network effects.   Specifically, we extend the literature by considering how the firm can 
strategically engineer the strength of network effects and to empirically verify the implicit 
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assumption of the business strategy of sparking adoption by giving its product away.   
First, if the product is susceptible to network effects, a larger network may boost the value 
of the product to each user and implicitly increase the willingness-to-pay of potential 
adopters.  Second, it may induce word-of-mouth effect, leading to faster or more efficient 
propagation of information about the product thus helping consumers in the valuation 
learning process.  Yet, the extant literature is yet to provide an empirical study to test the 
above two sub-assumptions. 
Effects of Product, Price, and Promotion Cues  
Besides two key sets of variables, we aim to provide some normative insights with regard 
to three of the traditional four Ps for the developers in the markets of extreme 
competition, i.e., product, price, and promotional tools.   Product features include 
“content rating”, “app category”, and “file size”.  The “content rating” resembles MPAA 
rating in movie industry.  Based on the literature on motion pictures, the influence of 
MPAA rating on box office is mixed (Basuroy, Chatterjee, and Ravid 2003; Boatwright, 
Basuroy, and Kamakura 2007; and Dellaroacs, Zhang, and Awad 2007).  Therefore, the 
effect of content rating in mobile app industry is unclear.  The “File size” resembles the 
runtime of movies.  Moon, Bergy and Iabucci(2010) found a significant positive influence 
of runtime on box office revenues in the opening week.   Guo and Papatla(2012) also find 
positive effect of runtime on number of user reviews.   The possible explanation is that 
the runtime of the movie is a proxy of quality of motion pictures, since it requires more 
resources.   Although a number of studies explore the effects of product attributes of 
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motion pictures, books, TVs, CDs, etc, no one has yet investigate the influence of app 
attributes on user adoption.  
Pricing is another key aspect of the marketing mix.  In extremely competitive 
markets, a prominent fear among businesses if the likely loss of customers to the many 
still-free competitors (Pauwels and Weiss 2008).  Therefore, products in such markets are 
generally offered for free or at a very low price.   Free products may help the businesses 
boost product adoptions because, beyond the absence of monetary costs, a free product 
will reduce consumers’ search costs and psychological costs (Ariely and Shampan’er 
2004).  Therefore, offering products for free may stimulate trial among consumers, which 
is an important implicit assumption underlie the business strategies currently adopted by 
companies in extremely competitive markets.  However, no one has yet empirically tested 
the assumption.  
Prior work suggests that promotional cues can signal quality of the product, which 
may ultimately influence consumers’ purchase decision. For instance, in Erdem and 
Keane(1996) and Anand and Shachar(2002), advertising content and user experience 
provide noisy signals about brand attributes. Ackerbery(2003) also suggests that 
advertising intensity and use experience signal product quality.  In present study, we also 
aim to test the influence of promotional cues of products on user base.  
In summary, the user base of a certain app may be influenced by the 
aforementioned three major factors: competitive products, firms’ previous products, and 
some of the intrinsic attributes of the product. I next describe the data on which I 
empirically investigate whether those effects do occur.  
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2.3 Overview of Data  
Our primary interest in this research is what factors expand user base. We, therefore, 
collected data on mobile apps from a major App Store on Oct. 28, 2012. There are two 
main features of our data: (1) the dataset has a hierarchical structure. The first level is the 
application-level. The second level is developer-level. The 2,422 apps are developed by 
248 developers. There are 11 Application-level factors and 3 Developer-level factors; (2) 
the website of data source requires that all the reviewers download the applications 
before they rate the applications. Therefore, the data avoid the situation of fake reviews. 
The variable definitions and summary statistics are displayed in Table II-1 to Table II-6.  
2.3.1 Dependent Variable  
The number of downloads we collected is the range of downloads. For instance, the 
number of downloads of “Slot Machine” is 5,000,000-10,000,000 as of Oct. 28, 2012. 
There are 12 categories in total.  
Table II-1: Distribution of Downloads 
Category Range of Downloads Number of Apps Percentage 
1 <100 102 4.21% 
2 100 - 500 148 6.11% 
3 500 - 1,000 78 3.22% 
4 1,000 - 5,000 250 10.32% 
5 5,000 - 10,000 160 6.61% 
6 10,000 - 50,000 409 16.89% 
7 50,000 - 100,000 185 7.64% 
8 100,000 - 500,000 440 18.17% 
9 500,000 - 1,000,000 174 7.18% 
10 1,000,000 - 5,000,000 342 14.12% 
11 5,000,000 - 10,000,000 76 3.14% 
12 >10,000,000 58 2.39% 
Note: This table shows the number of downloads of applications. Originally, there are 
seventeen categories. We grouped 1-5, 5-10, 10-50, 50-100 as category of “<100”. 
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Table II-1 demonstrates the distributions of downloads. From the table, we can see that 
there are 440 apps whose downloads ranged from 100,000-500,000. The second largest 
number of downloads falls into the range of 10,000-50,000. About 86.56% applications 
have at least 1,000 downloads.  The download of all apps in my dataset is roughly normally 
distributed.  
2.3.2 Independent Variables   
Product Attributes, Price, and Promotional cues 
The present study includes three major sets of app attributes: (1) Product attributes; (2) 
Price; (3) Promotional cues.  
Product Attributes 
The product attributes can be represented by three variables: “Content rating”, 
“Category”, and “file size”.    
Table II-2 Summary Statistics of Product Attributes 
Category Variable name Number of Apps Percentage 
1 Arcade 386 15.94% 
2 Brain 280 11.56% 
3 Cards 33 1.36% 
4 Casual 373 15.40% 
5 Racing 228 9.41% 
6 Sport 336 13.87% 
7 Wallpaper  360 14.86% 
8 Widget 126 5.20% 
1 Video-yes 772 31.87% 
2 Video-no 1650 68.13% 
1 Everyone  1235 50.99% 
2 High maturity  223 9.21% 
3 Low maturity  523 21.59% 
4 Medium maturity 441 18.21% 
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“File Size” measures the installation space that the application needs on the mobile 
device. The range of file size is 1484 MB. It is right-skewed. The largest file size is more 
than 1G.  File size in this market can be a proxy of the quality of each app: the larger the 
file size, the more content contained in the app.  “Content Rating” measures the maturity 
level of the application content. There are four different levels, everyone, low maturity 
(lm), medium maturity (mm), and high maturity (hm). 1,235 applications are made for 
everyone (50.99%). “Category” indicates the type of the applications. There are eight 
types of applications: arcade, brain, cards, casual, racing, sport, wallpaper, and widget. 
Arcade and wallpaper are the largest two types of applications. “video” means whether 
there’s YouTube Video on the embedded on the webpage of the Apps.  
Price 
The price of applications is different from other continuous variable. 1487(61.40%) 
applications are free and therefore the price is “0”. The rest of them (935 applications) 
are paid applications and the range of price for paid ones is $7.99. Since the price 
dispersion of paid apps is very small, it is more meaningful to treat it as dummy variable. 
We then recode the free apps as “1s” and paid apps as “0s”.   With regard to effect of  
price, we expect that free apps will be more likely to gain larger user base, based on the 
opinions of conventional economist that lower price will stimulate demand in the 
marketplace.   
Promotional Cues 
The third element – promotional cues – is measured by three variables: “if there’s 
promotional video”, “how many screenshots”, and “if it has high average rating”.   
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Providing promotional video and screenshots may assist users in choosing apps and, in 
return, get satisfaction for its product from users.   Besides, the promotional video may 
create awareness of products among YouTube viewers.  “Numscrn” measures the number 
of Screenshots of each application displayed on the website of the app. These screenshots 
can act as advertising by illustrating the app’s characteristics to users. “Average rating” 
may reflect users’ knowledge of the product and service based on their experience with 
it and his consequent discovery of its unique features and benefits or drawbacks (Feng 
and Papatla 2011).  Therefore, a higher user rating may help the apps acquire more 
downloads in the future.  The average rating is overwhelmingly positive.   Most 
applications receive an average rating of 4 or above.  
Table II-3 Summary Statistics of Other Product Attributes 
 Min. 1st Qu Median Mean 3rd Qu Max. 
rating 0.000 3.900 4.200 4.001 4.500 5.000 
price 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.818 0.990 7.990 
numscrn 0.000 3.000 5.000 4.617 5.000 8.000 
filesize 0.006 1.900 5.700 16.890 14.000 1843.000 
 
Effects of Competition 
Competitive apps in the markets influence the download level of a similar app in terms of 
price and total number of user reviews.   To account for the effects of competition, we 
include four variables to examine the influence of competitive apps in terms of price and 
total number user reviews.   Due to the large number of competitive applications, we do 
not include the price and number of user reviews of each competitor separately 
(Neelamegham and Chintagunta 2004; Gopinath, Chintagunta, and Venkataraman 2010).   
Similar to Gopinath et al.(2010) and Chintagunta et al.(2010), we create four covariates 
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of competition based on the applications featured on the website of the focal application 
or online recommendation system of the App Store.  The first two variables are average 
price and number of user reviews of applications featured as “viewed by the same user”.    
Another two variables are average price and review counts of applications featured as 
“installed by the same user”.    All apps featured on the webpage can be viewed as 
competitors of the focal app.   And the set of four variables represents the competitive 
influence on the focal apps.   Our expectation is that the higher price of the competitive 
apps, the more likely that the user downloads the focal app.   The number of user reviews, 
however, represent the past installation base since a user can post a review on the store 
only after she actually downloads the product.  The past installation base may create a 
network effects among users – the more people use it, the more likely that the app 
attracts more users (Dube, Hitsch, and Chintagunta 2008).  Therefore, we expect that the 
user reviews of the competitive app will have a negative effect on the download of the 
focal app.   
Table II-4 Description and Summary Statistics of four Competition Variables 
Description of Variables 
vvc Average Counts of the Apps Viewed by similar Users 
vvp Average price of the Apps Viewed by similar Users 
ivc Average Counts of the Apps Installed by similar Users 
ivp Average Price of the Apps Installed by similar Users 
Summary Statistics 
 Min. 1st Qu Median Mean 3rd Qu Max. 
vvc 0.000 3833 14364 35814 44295 754480 
vvp 0.000 0.000 0.740 0.955 1.480 8.310 
ivc 0.000 54 121 1256 430 131171 
ivp 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.832 1.590 8.070 
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Table II-4 reports the description of each competition measure.   From the summary 
statistics, we can see the average review counts of apps viewed by the same user are 
much higher than average review counts installed by the same user.  Therefore, the apps 
featured as “viewed by the same user” are highly popular in the market.  However, the 
average price of the apps viewed by the same user is a little bit higher than the average 
price installed by the same user, which indicates that users may be interested in popular 
apps but still want to install those apps with lower price. We, therefore, expect price to 
play a significant role in generating downloads.    
Effects of Other Apps  
To examine the above influence of network effects created by other apps developed by 
the same developer, we create three variables: (1) Total number of apps developed; (2) 
The average number of user reviews; (3) The average price.    
Table II-5 Summary Statistics of Developer-Level Attributes 
Variable Description 
dac the total number of the applications display on Google Play  
dvp the average review counts of applications developed by the same developer 
dvp the average price of applications developed by the same developer 
Correlation Matrix Summary Statistics 
 dac dvc dvp Min.    1st Qu. Median  Mean    3rd Qu. Max.    
dac 1.000 -0.425 -0.046 5.00 12.00 28.00 31.970 49.00 72.00 
dvc  1.000 -0.092 1 127 988 11460 8908 294800 
dvp   1.000 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.60 0.93 5.37 
Table II-5 displays the descriptions and summary statistics of each variable and also 
presents the correlations between the three variables. “dac” measures the total number 
of the applications developed by the developer before. Therefore, this variable measures, 
to some extent, the size of each developer. The variable has a range of 67. The distribution 
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of developer size is right-skewed. Most of developers have 28 or less applications.  This 
reflects that the market is dominated by small developers. No one, then, has the power 
to exert influence on others with regard to price.  “dvc” measure the average review 
counts of applications developed by the same developer previous. The range of the 
average review counts is 294,800. And again, the distribution of it is roughly normally 
distributed but a little bit right-skewed.  Developers with higher average review counts 
have higher downloads.   “dvp” measures the average price of applications developed by 
the same developer. The range of it is 5.37 and it is also roughly normally distributed.  
The correlations between the three developer-level variables are relatively low.  
However, the correlations among the three variables are all negative.  Though the 
correlations are weak, it indicates that more experienced developers are less likely to gain 
higher average counts and have higher price.   In addition, price and review count are 
negatively correlated.  
Correlations Between App-level Attributes.  
In Table II-6, correlations among variables are displayed. All correlations lie between -0.5 
to 0.5. Therefore, multicollinearity problem would not be a problem in our analysis.   
Table II-6 Correlation Matrix of Application-Level Attributes 
 dnlds count rating price nums video filesiz vvc vvp ivc ivp 
1 1.000           
2 0.352 1.000          
3 0.362 0.132 1.000         
4 -0.427 -0.127 -0.091 1.000        
5 0.088 0.058 0.155 0.167 1.000       
6 0.141 0.149 0.117 0.130 0.209 1.000      
7 0.043 0.038 0.010 0.193 0.074 0.133 1.000     
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8 0.171 0.112 0.085 -0.134 0.031 0.043 0.008 1.000    
9 0.081 0.102 0.022 0.321 0.130 0.192 0.146 -0.147 1.000   
10 0.214 0.280 0.091 -0.089 0.060 0.125 0.069 0.062 0.052 1.000  
11 -0.486 -0.112 -0.150 0.709 0.125 0.107 0.106 -0.144 0.350 -0.094 1.000 
Note:  
1. “dnlds” represents total number of downloads(dependent variable) 
2. “nums” represents number of screen shots 
3. We only include application-level covariates in this correlation matrix. 
From the correlation table, we found that price and downloads are negatively correlated. 
Therefore, free apps, have larger user bases compared to paid apps.   In addition, the 
average price of the apps installed by the same users is negatively correlated with 
downloads.  Therefore, it seems users have a budget on expenditures of apps.   Price is 
also negatively correlated with average rating, which indicates that users seem to give 
lower ratings for free apps.     
2.4 Model Specification 
Considering the characteristics of our dependent variable, we use the Ordinal Logit Model 
to investigate the behavior of product adoption in mobile app market. There are several 
reasons that Ordinal Logit Model is adopted. First, downloads is categorical and ordered; 
second, the interval is not equal. The adjacent two categories are 10 times difference; 
third, downloads occur in category j before it can occur in category j+1. However, 12 
categories are too many for the model to converge and it’s computationally demanding. 
We, therefore, reduce the 12 categories to 6 categories by combining the adjacent two 
categories and code each category as “1”, “2”, “3”, “4”, “5”, and “6”, correspondingly, and 
implement Ordinal Logit model in Bayesian Paradigm.  
24 
 
 
 
Table II-7 Recoded Dependent Variable - Downloads 
Ordinal 
Responses 
Range of Downloads # of Apps Percentage 
“1” <100; 100 - 500 250 10.32% 
“2” 500 - 1,000; 1,000 - 5,000 328 13.54% 
“3” 5,000 - 10,000; 10,000 - 50,000 569 23.50% 
“4” 50,000 - 100,000; 100,000 - 500,000 625 25.91% 
“5” 
500,000 - 1,000,000; 1,000,000 - 
5,000,000 
516 21.30% 
“6” 5,000,000 - 10,000,000; >10,000,000 134 5.51% 
Basic setting of Ordinal Logit Model: 
Assume that the utility of application 𝑖 is represented by an unobservable latent variable 
𝑈𝑖. The downloads of application 𝑖 will jump to a certain level on the basis of 𝑈𝑖.  
𝑈𝑖 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀 
The threshold parameters obey the ordering constraint: 𝜃1 < 𝜃2 < 𝜃3 < 𝜃4 < 𝜃5 
𝑦𝑖 = 1 
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑
→   𝑈𝑖 < 𝜃1 
𝑦𝑖 = 2 
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑
→   𝜃1 < 𝑈𝑖 < 𝜃2 
𝑦𝑖 = 3 
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑
→   𝜃2 < 𝑈𝑖 < 𝜃3 
𝑦𝑖 = 4 
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑
→   𝜃3 < 𝑈𝑖 < 𝜃4 
𝑦𝑖 = 5 
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑
→   𝜃4 < 𝑈𝑖 < 𝜃5 
𝑦𝑖 = 6 
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑
→   𝑈𝑖 > 𝜃5 
Assume that 𝜀  follows a logistic distribution, which means the cumulative 
distribution of 𝜀 is 𝐹(𝜀) = exp (𝜀) (1 + exp(𝜀))⁄ . Therefore, 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏("1") = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑈𝑖 < 𝜃1) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀 < 𝜃1) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜀 < 𝜃1 − 𝜇𝑖) 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏("2") = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜃1 < 𝑈𝑖 < 𝜃2) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜃1 < 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀 < 𝜃2) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜃1 − 𝜇𝑖 < 𝜀 < 𝜃2 − 𝜇𝑖) 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏("3") = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜃2 < 𝑈𝑖 < 𝜃3) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜃2 < 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀 < 𝜃3) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜃2 − 𝜇𝑖 < 𝜀 < 𝜃3 − 𝜇𝑖) 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏("4") = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜃3 < 𝑈𝑖 < 𝜃4) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜃3 < 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀 < 𝜃4) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜃3 − 𝜇𝑖 < 𝜀 < 𝜃4 − 𝜇𝑖) 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏("5") = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜃4 < 𝑈𝑖 < 𝜃5) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜃4 < 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀 < 𝜃5) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜃4 − 𝜇𝑖 < 𝜀 < 𝜃5 − 𝜇𝑖) 
             𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏("6") = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑈𝑖 > 𝜃5) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀 > 𝜃5) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜀 > 𝜃5 − 𝜇𝑖)            
25 
 
 
 
The Utility of application 𝑖 can be related to two groups of observable variables: 
the application-level variables and the developer-level variables. For instance, the higher 
the review counts of an application the more will be the number of downloads. On the 
other hand, the higher the price of an application the fewer will be the number of users 
who download it. Therefore, we have our Baseline Model below: 
Model 1 (Baseline Model): Ordinal Logit Model    
Both application-level variables and developer-level variables were simply included in the 
basic model. By implementing this model, we’ll ignore the hierarchical structure inherent 
in our data and just fit an ordinary ordinal logit model. The results of this model are 
displayed in table II-10. 
𝜇𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽1 log(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽2𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3 log(𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽4 log(𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽5lm𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽6ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽7𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽8𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽9𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽10𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽11𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽12𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽13𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽14𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽15 log(𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗) 
+𝛽16 log(𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽17 log(𝑣𝑣𝑝𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽18 log(𝑖𝑣𝑐𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽19 log(𝑖𝑣𝑝𝑖𝑗) 
+𝛼1 log(𝑑𝑎𝑐𝑗) + 𝛼2 log(𝑑𝑣𝑐𝑗) + 𝛼3 log(𝑑𝑣𝑝𝑗) 
 
However, some unobserved factors will affect downloads of the application. For 
instance, the duration since the application was released or the requirement of an 
android system, could affect downloads? In the previous analysis, we pooled all 
applications together and made the assumption that one application is independent from 
another. However, our data structure suggests that applications developed by the same 
developer may have some common characteristics. To accounts for the multilevel data 
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structure, we introduce a developer-specific parameter 𝜂𝑗  to the utility function. Our 
second model, therefore, is:  
Model 2: Ordinal Logit Model with Random Intercepts 
In the random intercept model, the intercepts are defined in the developer-level. In the 
Bayesian approach, each intercept is given an informative prior, or, put another way, the 
intercepts become modeled parameters. Therefore, random intercept model can capture 
part of heterogeneity caused by developers. The results of this model are displayed in 
table II-11.  
Level 1:  
𝜇𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽1 log(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽2𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3 log(𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽4 log(𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽5lm𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽6ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽7𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽8𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽9𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽10𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽11𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽12𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽13𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽14𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽15 log(𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗) 
+𝛽16 log(𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽17 log(𝑣𝑣𝑝𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽18 log(𝑖𝑣𝑐𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽19 log(𝑖𝑣𝑝𝑖𝑗) + 𝜂𝑗  
 
Level 2:  
𝜂𝑗~𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(𝜇. 𝜂𝑗 , 𝜎. 𝜂) 
𝜇. 𝜂𝑗 = 𝛼1 log(𝑑𝑎𝑐𝑗) + 𝛼2log (𝑑𝑣𝑐𝑗) + 𝛼3log (𝑑𝑣𝑝𝑗) 
To further account for developer heterogeneity, we allow random effects in both 
intercepts and application-level slopes. Therefore, we have our third model:  
Model 3: Ordinal Logit Model with Random Coefficients 
In the Random Coefficient Model, we assume there are j separate slopes for each variable 
and each estimate follows a normal distribution, where j represent a developer. By 
allowing each estimate to vary across different developers, we can control the influence 
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of unobserved heterogeneity of developers on each variable. Besides, we add a random 
component 𝛿𝑖𝑗, which can capture unobserved heterogeneity among applications.  The 
results of this model are displayed in the table II-12.  
𝜇𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽𝑗,1 log(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽𝑗,2𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗,3log (𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽𝑗,4 log(𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽𝑗,5lm𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽𝑗,6ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗,7𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗,8𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗,9𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗,10𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽𝑗,11𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗,12𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗,13𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗,14𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽𝑗,15 log(𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽𝑗,16 log(𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽𝑗,17 log(𝑣𝑣𝑝𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽𝑗,18 log(𝑖𝑣𝑐𝑖𝑗)
+ 𝛽𝑗,19 log(𝑖𝑣𝑝𝑖𝑗) + 𝜂𝑗  
𝛽𝑗𝑘~𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(𝜇. 𝛽𝑘 , 𝜏. 𝛽𝑘), 𝑘 = 1,2,…19 
𝜇. 𝛽𝑘~𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(0, 0.001) 
𝜏. 𝛽𝑘~𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎(0.001,0.001) 
 
𝜂𝑗~𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(𝜇. 𝜂𝑗 , 𝜎. 𝜂) 
𝜇. 𝜂𝑗 = 𝛼1 log(𝑑𝑎𝑐𝑗) + 𝛼2log (𝑑𝑣𝑐𝑗) + 𝛼3log (𝑑𝑣𝑝𝑗) 
𝛼𝑚~𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(0,0.001) 
𝜎. 𝜂~𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎(0.001,0.001) 
To fit the proposed models, we take a Bayesian Approach to estimate parameters 
and the four cutoff points. For all models, we assume diffuse priors and run a Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo sampler for 5,000 iteration which serves as a burn-in period. We then 
obtain inferences from posterior samples from the next 20,000 iterations.  
2.5 Empirical Results 
2.5.1 Model Comparison and Unobserved heterogeneity 
Table II-8 illustrates the DIC scores, the random error, and the cutoffs of the three models.    
Table II-8 Results of random effects, model fit, and Cutoffs 
 Ordinal Logit Model Random Intercepts Random Coefficients 
 mean 2.5% 97.5% mean 2.5% 97.5% mean 2.5% 97.5% 
𝜎𝜂   1.570 0.153 1.300 1.790 1.397 2.260 
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𝜎         0.452 0.098 0.278 
 Dbar Dhat DIC Dbar Dhat DIC Dbar Dhat DIC 
 5308 5282 5333 4618 4393 4842 3786 3081 4490 
 mean 2.5% 97.5% mean 2.5% 97.5% mean 2.5% 97.5% 
cutoff1 0.009 0.000 0.032 0.016 0.001 0.058 0.019 0.001 0.073 
cutoff2 1.565 1.419 1.720 2.061 1.856 2.296 2.631 2.364 2.958 
cutoff3 3.859 3.654 4.073 4.861 4.561 5.184 6.120 5.707 6.608 
cutoff4 6.546 6.251 6.840 8.075 7.638 8.517 10.020 9.446 10.720 
cutoff5 9.796 9.386 10.230 11.820 11.260 12.420 14.770 13.980 15.770 
 
We can see that the DIC score of random coefficient model is much lower than the other 
two models, thus provides clear evidence that it is critical to account for heterogeneity 
among developers in an analysis of the effects of app attributes on downloads.   
Moreover, the error itself is significantly positive, which indicates that there’s substantial 
unobserved heterogeneity among developers (𝜎𝜂 = 1.79).  The random error represents 
unobserved heterogeneity among apps (𝜎 = 0.452) which is also significantly positive.    
Table II-9 illustrates the impact of unobserved developer heterogeneity on each 
variable.   From the table, we can see the unobserved variance of average rating, price, 
and racing, are the largest three, which indicates that the app difference on rating, price, 
and Racing are mostly attributed to unknown heterogeneity among developers. The 
unobserved heterogeneity of developer plays an important role on the effects of each 
factor.   
Table II-9 Radom effects of each factor 
Unobserved Variance  mean val2.5pc val97.5pc 
rating 1.107 0.490 2.109 
video 0.944 0.555 1.414 
price 1.246 0.753 1.746 
numscrn 0.851 0.539 1.240 
filesize 0.479 0.313 0.687 
arcade 0.989 0.516 1.526 
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brain 0.742 0.385 1.266 
cards 0.875 0.379 1.645 
casual 0.706 0.357 1.181 
racing 1.623 0.921 2.393 
sport 0.788 0.389 1.347 
wallpaper 0.974 0.409 1.766 
lm 0.690 0.386 1.093 
hm 0.811 0.390 1.526 
mm 0.738 0.365 1.278 
vvc 0.459 0.302 0.656 
vvp 0.573 0.391 0.767 
ivp 0.575 0.367 0.819 
ivc 0.484 0.317 0.674 
2.5.2 Effects of App Attributes  
Table 11-10 demonstrates the posterior means of intrinsic app attributes by 
implementing the three different models.   
Table II-10 Results of Model with App-Level Attributes 
 Ordinal Logit Model Random Intercepts Random Coefficients 
 mean 2.5% 97.5% mean 2.5% 97.5% mean 2.5% 97.5% 
𝛽1 -2.166** -2.509 -1.825 -3.586** -4.040 -3.126 -4.163** -4.737 -3.545 
𝛽2 0.180** 0.000 0.371 0.801** 0.532 1.088 1.010** 0.611 1.394 
𝛽3 -0.005 -0.100 0.095 0.052 -0.077 0.189 0.113 -0.120 0.357 
𝛽4 -0.166** -0.249 -0.083 -0.186** -0.300 -0.077 -0.220** -0.423 -0.027 
𝛽5 0.366** 0.161 0.561 0.492** 0.213 0.778 0.591** 0.209 0.984 
𝛽6 0.852** 0.543 1.171 0.776** 0.264 1.308 0.822** 0.113 1.505 
𝛽7 0.236 -0.023 0.491 0.487** 0.140 0.852 0.599** 0.162 1.107 
𝛽8 4.703** 4.350 5.098 4.985** 4.443 5.494 5.834** 4.727 6.823 
𝛽9 4.732** 4.375 5.124 5.271** 4.701 5.798 6.100** 5.069 7.109 
𝛽10 3.950** 3.573 4.360 4.080** 3.443 4.677 4.495** 3.374 5.443 
𝛽11 4.305** 3.969 4.667 4.722** 4.193 5.235 5.450** 4.434 6.449 
𝛽12 4.290** 3.938 4.677 4.461** 3.905 4.989 4.695** 3.711 5.614 
𝛽13 4.211** 3.883 4.576 4.513** 3.940 4.998 4.972** 4.018 5.834 
𝛽14 2.948** 2.586 3.318 1.952** 1.453 2.427 1.624** 0.921 2.345 
𝛽15 0.932** 0.559 1.447 0.916** 0.505 1.481 1.987** 1.067 3.346 
 “Price”, as we expected, has significantly negative influence on the number of 
downloads (𝛽1 = −2.166). The magnitude of the mean estimates on price is increasing 
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as the model accounting for more unobserved heterogeneity among developers.  The 
absolute magnitude of price estimates using random intercepts model (𝛽1 = −3.586) 
and random coefficient model (𝛽1 = −4.163) becomes greater.   “Youtube Video” has 
significantly positive influence on the number of downloads across the three models.  It 
indicates that providing video may help to generate more downloads for the app (𝛽2 =
1.010).  “File size", as a proxy of App quality, surprisingly, has significantly negative 
influence on the number of downloads (𝛽4 = −0.220).  Thus, smaller apps are more likely 
to be downloaded by users.  “Number of Screenshots”, however, do not have any 
significant an effect on number of downloads.      
 The estimates of 𝛽5−7 represent the effects of content rating on the number of 
downloads. The base level is “Everyone”, which means the application is appropriate for 
everyone to use. Compared to base level “Everyone”, all the other three levels, low 
maturity (𝛽5 = 0.5907 ), high maturity (𝛽6 = 0.8218 ), and medium maturity (𝛽7 =
0.5990), have significantly positive influence on number of downloads.  Apps of high 
maturity level are among the most popular ones.  
 The estimates of 𝛽8−14  represent effects of the category of applications. 
Compared to base level “widget”, all the other seven levels, arcade, brain,  cards, casual, 
racing, sports, and wallpaper, have significantly positive influence on number of 
downloads. The category of “brain” exert largest influence on the number of downloads. 
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2.5.3 Effects of Other Apps  
The estimates of 𝛼1−3  represent the influence of other apps developed by each 
developer.  The set of variables are the key findings of present research.    
Table II-11 Results of Effects of Other Products of the Developer 
 Ordinal Logit Model Random Intercepts Random Coefficients 
 mean 2.5% 97.5% mean 2.5% 97.5% mean 2.5% 97.5% 
𝛼1 0.006 -0.132 0.144 0.989** 0.562 1.496 1.505** 0.958 2.253 
𝛼2 1.274** 1.147 1.392 1.781** 1.501 2.110 2.404** 2.009 2.857 
𝛼3 0.058 -0.062 0.173 -0.064 -0.306 0.181 -0.234 -0.559 0.090 
From table II-11, we can see the total number of applications developed by the 
developer positively influence the number of downloads. As the unobserved 
heterogeneity among developers is controlled, the influence becomes significantly 
positive (𝛼1 = 1.505), which provides support to the industry’s assumption that acquiring 
users for one application will create network effects among current users and help in 
acquiring users for future applications.   
The average number of user reviews of the applications developed by the 
developer, as we expected, has a significant positive effect on the number of downloads 
as well (𝛼2 = 2.404), thus supporting the industry’s second assumption that enhancing 
word of mouth among current users will lead to even larger user base. Further, as 
developers’ unobserved heterogeneity is controlled, the positive influence becomes more 
salient.  
The average price of the applications developed by the developer, interestingly, 
does not have any significant effect on the number of downloads.   However, we do find 
that average price has negative effects on the number of downloads once a new 
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application is released into the market.    The reason might be the price of the new app is 
also relatively high compared to the similar apps in the marketplace.  
2.5.4 Effects of Competition   
The estimates of 𝛽16−19 indicate the influence of competition in the market.  The set of 
variables again reflects the key findings of present research.    
Table II-12 Results of Competition Effects 
 Ordinal Logit Model Random Intercepts Random Coefficients 
 mean 2.5% 97.5% mean 2.5% 97.5% mean 2.5% 97.5% 
𝛽16 -0.027 -0.110 0.054 0.037 -0.059 0.139 0.068 -0.083 0.216 
𝛽17 0.241** 0.153 0.325 0.297** 0.197 0.395 0.348** 0.196 0.499 
𝛽18 0.632** 0.525 0.741 0.776** 0.651 0.906 1.013** 0.818 1.211 
𝛽19 -0.905** -1.061 -0.748 -0.751** -0.926 -0.555 -0.991** -1.274 -0.728 
First, we found that the average price of the apps viewed by the same user is 
positive and significant ( β17 = 0.348 ).  Therefore, the higher the price of those 
competitive apps, the more likely is that the users download this app.  The estimate 
provides some evidence of the existence of extreme competition in such markets.   If the 
developers expect to acquire a large number of users, they must offer their products at a 
lower price compared to competitive apps.  
Second, the average review counts of the applications installed by the same user 
again have significantly positive effects on the number of downloads (β18 = 1.013) of 
similar apps.   Since, as what we observed from our data, the apps featured as “installed 
by the same users” includes both competitive and complementary apps.  The implication 
is that users tend to install apps similar/complement to the apps which are currently 
popular in the market.     
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Third, the average price of the applications installed by the same user has 
significantly negative effects on the number of downloads (β19 = −0.991).  Therefore, if 
the users installed many higher priced apps on their device, it is less likely for them to 
download a similar or complementary app.    The explanation could be that the users have 
a budget constraint on the apps installed on their device.    
Finally, we do not find any significant effects of the average number of user 
reviews of the apps featured as “also viewed by the same user”.   
2.6 Conclusion 
2.6.1 A Summary of Results 
In the present research, we propose and empirically test many assumptions to explain 
what drives businesses to succeed in extremely competitive markets.   Currently, many 
new markets develop rapidly even though they operate their businesses even when the 
marginal revenue is lower than the marginal cost.   In the present research, we label such 
markets as extremely competitive.  The issues examined in this research aim to answer 
the question of why firms continue in market with extreme competition while struggling 
to be profitable.  There could be two explanations. The first explanation is that by offering 
their products for free or at a very low price, marketers expect to acquire a large group of 
users in a relatively short time span, in the hope of making profits from those advertisers 
who are interested in the use groups.   The second explanation is that the marketers 
expect the users will eventually purchase their premium products after they try their 
product for free.    However, the key assumption underlying both outcomes is that the 
34 
 
 
 
marketers need to obtain a large group of user base.   A further question that this brings 
up is: what factors contribute to the acquisition of a large user group by businesses?  We 
propose and test two explanations.  Specifically, our first explanation is that acquiring 
users for a product will help in acquiring users for other products since the user base 
already obtained by the firm will create network effects.  To be specific, an app that 
acquired users may become the source of users for the products that follow.  Once the 
developer releases another product into the market, therefore, the user base of its other 
products may start using those products as well.   The second assumption is that multiple 
products with acquired users should help even more in acquiring users for new product, 
or conversely, we can say that firms can enhance WOM for their current products, which 
may help them attract more users once they release a new product into the market.   
However, few academic studies have formally tested the two assumptions so far.  The 
objective, therefore, of the present research is to explicitly verify the two assumptions 
and provide some normative insights for the businesses in the markets of extreme 
competition.    
To empirically examine the effects of those factors on installation base, we collect 
2,422 observations across 248 developers from a large App Store.  Three set of variables 
were included in our research: (1) The characteristics of apps; (2) The competition of the 
market; (3) The proxies of the influence of other apps.  The success of each app is 
measured by the number of downloads.  We develop a hierarchical ordinal logit model 
and calibrate it using Bayesian methods.  Empirical results support the two assumptions 
proposed in our research.  Specifically, we find that apps developed by the same 
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developer help in acquiring users for new products thus providing empirical evidence for 
our two assumptions.  In other words, developers with a product released into the 
marketplace are more likely to acquire users once they release another product.   There 
are many explanations of the mechanism.   The first explanation could be that the users 
of other products will directly become users of their new product.   Furthermore, the 
users of the developer will spread word of mouth, which may indirectly help the 
developers acquiring users for their new products.   The third explanation is that 
developers with more products will have more exposures among the users which may 
lead to liking and ultimate behavior of install.       
We found evidence of the existence of extreme competition in such markets.   
First, we found that users, facing a myriad of similar choices, are more likely to choose 
the product with the lowest price, which explain the source of extreme competition.  
Developers are keen to offer products with lower price in the hope of expanding their 
user base at the sacrifice of profits.   Second, our research revealed that apps installed on 
users’ device are widely discussed among consumers.  In addition, users are more likely 
to install a similar of a complementary app on their device.   Third, users seem to have a 
budget constraint on the apps installed on their device.   If they already installed a number 
of apps with a relatively high average price, they are less likely to install a similar one.    
In addition to the two set of variables mentioned above, our research provides 
many normative insights into the industry.  First, we find that free apps indeed have larger 
user bases thus confirming extreme competition in the market.  The efforts that 
marketers put on advertising their products by providing YouTube video do help in 
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acquiring users.  Higher user rating is an important indicator of larger user base.   
However, the pictures displayed on their website make no difference in expanding user 
group.   In addition, apps requiring larger storage space will reduce the number of 
downloads.   Originally, we believe that the larger the file size, the more content included 
in the apps. However, we did not consider other two issues in our conceptual framework. 
First, the capacity of mobile device may limit downloads of applications with large file 
size. Second, some other psychological considerations of consumers may also influence 
consumers’ decision to download applications of large size.  Apps with higher content 
rating will have more people to download compared to those apps made for “Everyone”.   
Some of app categories are more popular in the market than others, for instance, “Brain”, 
“Arcade”, and “Casual”. Specifically, free applications are more likely to gain downloads 
than paid applications. However, since users can download free applications without any 
cost, downloads for the applications can not represent the quality of it. And thus, price 
cannot serve as indicator of quality for this special product. Another search attribute, file 
size, also negatively influence downloads, which is on the contrary of our expectation.  
2.6.2 Contributions 
The research makes three contributions to the academic research. First, our present study 
focuses on the markets where firms face such intense competition that the marginal 
revenue they earn cannot even compensate the marginal cost.  We then label such 
markets as extremely competitive and found some evidence of “extreme competition”.   
Second, our present study investigates the business strategies of the marketers used in 
such market and try to verify the implicit assumptions behind the different business 
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strategies.   Third, our present study aims to provide some normative insights for such 
market, which has never been examined empirically by previous studies.  Fourth, given 
the hierarchical nature of our data, unobserved developer heterogeneity is considered in 
our framework. Results demonstrate that the unobserved developer heterogeneities do 
play a very important role in generating downloads.  
2.6.3 Managerial Implications 
Marketers and application developers may find some important managerial implications 
from our findings.   First, free applications with smaller file size may generate more 
downloads in the marketplace. However, displaying more screenshots does not help app 
developers acquiring more users. Applications of higher content rating have more 
download rates, comparing to applications made for everyone. Brain, arcade, and casual 
applications have significantly more downloads than widgets.   Second, competition from 
similar applications is significant. Our research suggests that a good strategy for 
developers is to create similar apps which are very popular in the marketplace, since those 
apps are more likely to acquire user base.  Third,   developers play a very important role 
in generating large number of downloads. After controlling for the unobserved 
heterogeneity of developers,   we found that the more apps that the developers released 
into the market, the more likely that they acquire a large user base for their future 
products. In addition, users’ discussion of their application will increase user base for their 
future products.  
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2.6.4 Limitations and Future directions 
While our research provides some instructions for the apps market, there are some 
limitations. First, the apps data we collected are more game-like applications. Another 
type of applications, more informational and utilitarian applications, exists in the 
marketplace. The influence of attributes of this type of applications may be quite different 
from game-like applications.  
Second, many other important factors such as the duration that the application 
has been in the marketplace for, may have significant influence on the number of 
downloads. Therefore, we expect that the longer the applications in the marketplace, the 
more customer reviews they can get.  
Third, an important mechanism which is probably a bigger driver of app discovery 
is offline WOM and this face-to-face mechanism is not easily understood nor can easily 
be influenced. Many consumers instantly download applications that their 
friends/acquaintances are using when this discovery happens face-to-face as a friend can 
convey why he or she likes the applications and uses it. Knowing what friends or family 
members are using has a greater influence on the eventual choice. For example, if most 
friends of a consumer are using a particular location-sharing, photo-sharing, social 
networking, or other apps, know that can and probably will influence that consumer’s 
choice of an app. An important area for future research is to not only understand the 
varying effects of reviews on apps sales but also the review generation process that can 
determine how many reviews an app gets.  
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III. Price acts as a Proxy of Advertising? Explore the Role of Freemium 
Business Strategy in the Context of Extreme Competition 
Abstract 
Many prior studies show that online Word-Of-Mouth (WOM) affects sales, but the issue 
that why consumers would like to discuss the product online receives relatively less 
attention from marketers and researchers. The objective of the present study is to 
examine the drivers of online WOM of a category of unique products, mobile apps, under 
the context of extreme competition. We are especially interested in the role of Freemium 
business strategy adopted in such markets where products are mostly offered for free.  
The implicit assumption behind the strategy is that free products will create more WOM 
and thus increase user base.  However, the role of price in generating online WOM is 
mixed according to previous studies.  The present study aims to examine the question 
and provide some insights into the industry.  Results show that, contrary to the intuitive 
assumption of the markets that free apps will increase online WOM, premium products 
are more likely to generate discussion among users.  Effects of other factors on online 
WOM are found.   Conclusions and managerial implications are discussed.   
Key Words: Online WOM; Freemium Business Strategy; Extreme Competition, Mobile 
Applications 
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3.1 Introduction 
Give your service away for free, possibly ad supported but maybe not, acquire a lot of 
customers very efficiently through WOM, referral networks, organic search marketing, 
etc., then offer premium priced value added services or an enhanced version of your 
service to your customer base.  
------ Fred Wilson7 
In recently years, “Freemium” become a highly popular business model by which a 
product or service, such as software, media, games, web services, and so on, is provided 
free of charge, but a premium is charged for advanced features, functionality, or virtual 
goods8.   The business model has notably been in use for markets, such as mobile app 
market, online radio services, online blogs, etc.   Businesses in those markets are mostly 
operated based on their intuition, as Fred Wilson suggested that most marketers today 
adopt the Freemium business strategy under which they give their products or services 
for free, in the hope of acquiring a lot of customers very efficiently through WOM, referral 
networks, organic search marketing, etc.   The strategy indicates that businesses expect 
that online WOM will help in generating larger user base wherein Freemium is the driving 
force of online WOM.  However, the freemium business strategy is questionable in two 
aspects (a) whether online WOM will help in generating larger user bases (b) Whether 
Freemiums will generate more online WOM.    
                                                          
7 http://www.avc.com/a_vc/2006/03/my_favorite_bus.html 
8 http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-0-387-85895-1_6 
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Prior studies investigated the question from several perspectives.  First, the 
products sold in those markets, such as mobile apps, blogs, videos, radios, news, etc, are 
almost purely digital products. Lal and Sarvary (1999) suggest that products and services 
with primarily digital attributes can be easily communicated online and a number of 
empirical studies suggested that online WOM has positive influence on sales revenues in 
markets such as motion picture, books, CDs, and so on(Godes and Mayzlin, 2004; 
Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006; Feng and Papatla, 2011; Moe and Trusov, 2011; Godes and 
Silva, 2012).  Second, digital products are a special type of experiential products. Studies 
show that a consumer tends to rely more on others’ recommendations and product 
experience, when he considers and experiences product than a search product (Bearden 
and Etzel 1982; Childers and Rao 1992; King and Balasubramanian 1994; Klein 1998; Park 
and Lee 2009; Senecal and Nantel 2004). Compared to other physical experience goods, 
digital attributes are much more difficult to evaluate before or even after they actually 
experience the product. Online WOM, therefore, is critical for the products to succeed in 
the market, rather than product differentiation.  Third, markets of pure digital products 
are characterized by myriad choices and intense competition (Racherla, Furner, and Babb, 
2012). In these markets, hundreds of thousands of individual and small developers 
compete with others at a very low price and none is sufficiently large so as to exercise any 
influence whatsoever on prices. Therefore, price competition is not enough to help the 
businesses to stand out.  This again explains why businesses strive to enhance online 
WOM for their products and services.   Fourth, from the previous study, we do find that 
a larger user base not only contributes users to new products, but also spreads WOM 
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which may ultimately lead to more users.  The above characteristics of markets of 
extreme competition indicate the importance of creating online WOM for products and 
services if businesses want to succeed in such markets.   
The second question, i.e., what factors help in generating WOM in such markets, 
however, is yet to be addressed.   Although prior studies suggest that free applications 
will indeed acquire more downloads than paid ones, getting consumers to discover and 
download an app does not mean that consumers will stick to the app and ultimately post 
reviews online or share the product with their friends.  By using Freemium business 
model, consumers generally can acquire the products or services for free or at a very low 
price and easily get rid of them. Freemium strategy, therefore, may help businesses to 
expand user base, but not necessarily help them generate interests in products and 
services.  If consumers demonstrate no interest in the product, there are no opportunities 
for them to purchase premium products, refer the products to others, or click the ads 
embedded in the products.  Eventually, businesses adopting Freemium strategy will still 
have difficulties in monetizing their products.  Therefore, a major concern to these 
marketers is whether the Freemium business model will stimulate users to express their 
opinions online in this hyper-competitive landscape with a wide range of choices.  The 
present study aims to address this question.   
By empirically examining the data collected from a major Mobile Apps Store, the 
present study found that paid apps generate significantly more WOM than free 
applications when original user base considered.   Specifically, we first explore the role of 
free apps on the volume of WOM without considering the influence of user base.   Results 
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show that free applications will significantly boost the volume of online WOM, which is 
consistent with the results of Berger and Schwartz (2011).   We then, add the size of user 
base as an explanatory variable in our model. Since product diffusion theory suggests that 
internal influence is mainly determined by the number of consumers who have 
experienced the products (Mahajan, Muller, and Wind 2000), we expect that the user 
base acquired by the product would be interested in discussing it.  Results still indicate 
that free apps will boost the volume of online WOM but with a smaller magnitude.   
Subsequently, rather than relying on the size of the user base as an explanatory variable, 
we examine the effect of free apps on the likelihood that users spread WOM online after 
they download the applications.  This investigation reveals that the effects of Freemium 
indicated by the previous two models are spurious.   Paid applications, rather than free 
apps, will significantly boost volume of online WOM.   Effects of other factors are also 
found.  
We organize the remainder of this article as follows: in the next section, we 
provide an overview of previous literature on the relationship between price and online 
WOM. We then describe the data and estimation method and present the empirical 
results. Finally, we discuss the contribution of this research and the managerial 
implications of the results. 
3.2 Literature Review 
The predominant research focus of online WOM has been on the effects on sales of paid 
goods (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; Dellarocas et al. 2004; Duan et al. 2008; Godes and 
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Mayzlin 2004). Few studies, however, examine how to stimulate consumers to spread 
WOM online.   In particular, as a key element of market strategy, the effect of price on 
WOM has received very little attention from scholars.  The conventional wisdom of 
practitioners, however, suggests that consumers like getting products and services for 
free.  Interestingly, willingness to try free products does not mean that consumers like to 
discuss the products and ultimately buy premium products.   
3.2.1 Freemium and Online WOM 
Does the Freemium Strategy Increase Online WOM? 
Most WOM campaigns involve sending consumer promotional giveaways to encourage 
them to talk about the product.  Several previous studies suggest that giveaways will 
indeed generate positive effects on online WOM.  Holmes and Lett (1977) suggest that 
product sampling may stimulate WOM among users.   A recent study by Berger and 
Schwartz (2011) find that users who receive giveaways talk more than those who doesn’t.  
Specifically, they find that giving away the product itself or nonproduct extras (e.g., logo 
hats, recipes) are positively linked to more overall WOM. However, neither samples nor 
coupons and rebates were linked to an increase of WOM, though they may be useful for 
increasing other outcomes, such as sales, and quality of conversations.  They then suggest 
that businesses, that aim to generate more WOM, may send consumers the full product 
or related extras to try (Berger and Schwartz 2011).  Their explanation is that giveaways 
provide product experience which may boost information and reduce uncertainty (Hoch 
and Ha, 1986) thus making it easier for people to learn about the product and have an 
opinion to share.  Other studies examine the effects of free sample promotions on 
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measures such as belief strength and attitude (Marks and Kamins 1988), perceptions of 
the brand (Hamm et al, 1969), purchase event feedback, i.e., brand loyalty (Gedenk and 
Neslin 1999), and reciprocity (Cialdini 2001).  The results of these studies may give further 
support to the positive effects of free giveaways on online WOM found by Berger and 
Schwartz(2011).    However, these studies neither examine the effects on online WOM 
directly nor measure any long-term effects, they only suggest that free samples could 
generate positive brand attitudes towards brand.   Although Berger and Schwartz (2011) 
find that free giveaways do help in generating more discussions among the users, the 
findings may not be applied in pure digital markets due to the extreme competition and 
other uniqueness of the products.    
Does charging a price for products increase online WOM? 
The above literature suggests that free giveaways will stimulate online WOM, but some 
other studies suggest that premium products are more likely to generate online WOM, 
though the effects hasn’t verified directly so far.   A stream of research suggests that price 
can be interpreted as a cue for product quality (Gerstner 1985; Tao and Monroe 1989).   
The research indicates that, when faced with quality uncertainty, consumers are likely to 
use price as a signal of quality before they make purchase (Dodds et al, 1991; Grewal 
1995; Kirmani and Rao 2000; Mitra 1995; Rao and Monroe 1988, 1989).    A high customer 
satisfaction will be generated if the product performance is consistent with the premium 
price.  Several studies are found in this area. One notable study by Voss et al(1998) 
suggests that performance expectations will have a positive effect on satisfaction when 
there is price-performance consistency and will have no effect when price-performance 
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are inconsistent. Grewal, Krishnan, Baker, and Borin (1998) indicates that the influence of 
price discount on a brand’s perceived quality was minimal but exerted significant positive 
influence on perceived value since prices paid less than an individual’s reference price 
enhance buyers’ value perceptions (Grewal et al 1998).  Based on the aforementioned 
literature, a premium price may signal a high product performance. If users perceive that 
the price-performance is consistent, their expectations are met and satisfaction 
increased. Consumers, therefore, are likely to spread WOM, since consumer satisfaction 
or dissatisfaction is an important determinant of WOM (Yi 1990).  Some of the quality 
expectation may be disconfirmed by actual experience, and ultimately lead to 
dissatisfaction (Cadotte et al. 1987; Churchill and Surprenant 1982; Spreng et al. 1996; 
Rust et al. 1999).  Consumers may therefore engage in complaint behavior and spread 
negative WOM online.  Hence, higher product price will generate more WOM regardless 
consumers’ level of satisfaction.    
However, previous literature on the relationship of price premium and WOM is 
scarce, though these are a few exceptions.  Richins (1983b) examined negative WOM by 
dissatisfied consumers (telling others about their unsatisfactory experience) and 
indicated that negative WOM occurred when the problem was severe9.   In addition, 
consumers seem to give more weight to negative information than to positive 
information (Lutz 1975).  Curren and Folkes(1987) expanded on Richins’(1983b) work by 
examining whether communications for product performance influenced consumers’ 
positive as well as negative communications about products.    Li and Hitt(2010) suggests 
                                                          
9 High price is one of indicators of problem severity (Richins 1983b).  
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that price has positive effects on consumer ratings since it not only reflects the perceived 
product quality but also demonstrates the perceived value, i.e., the difference between 
price and perceived quality.  However, they did not examine the influence of price on 
WOM volume.    
In the present study, we aim to examine the influence of price on WOM volume 
in the markets of pure digital products, where others’ opinions are especially important. 
In the markets of pure digital products, although most of products are offered for free, a 
group of consumers who are seeking for high quality products believe that high price 
signal high quality, facing a myriad of options and a difficulty to differentiate product 
attributes.  These consumers may put more cognitive effort on high-priced items 
(Wathieu and Bertini 2007), and seek for product information before they purchase the 
product and examine the benefits of the product during the process of experiencing the 
product.  Thus they have a need to share their knowledge of the product based on their 
experience with it and their consequent discovery of its unique features and benefits or 
drawbacks (Feng and Papatla 2011).  Therefore, premium price can be considered as 
another vehicle of advertising demonstrating the product quality which helps the 
businesses attract more less-price sensitive users and, hence, share their opinions online. 
Along these lines, the present paper proposes that products sold at a premium price are 
more likely to spread their WOM online.   
Premium and Positive/Negative WOM   
Based on aforementioned literature, products sold at a premium price will generate 
online WOM because of (1) satisfaction due to price-performance consistency (2) 
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dissatisfaction due to price-performance inconsistency. Specifically, if the consumers 
perceived the price is confirmed by the high performance, they will have a need to share 
the good experience with others. However, if the product performance does not meet 
their expectations, they will vent their dissatisfaction by spreading negative WOM.  In this 
sense, premium price will help in generating either positive WOM when consumers are 
satisfied with the product or negative WOM when consumers are dissatisfied with the 
product.    
3.2.2 Effects of Other product attributes on online WOM 
Average rating 
The average rating is another indicator of product quality, perhaps a more accurate 
quality indicator than price, since average rating reflects the actual experience and 
evaluation of a group of users.  A number of studies indicate that higher average rating 
will lead to increased sales revenues (Forman et al. 2008; Chen et al. 2007; Dellarocas et 
al 2008; Clemons et al. 2006).  However, few studies examine the influence of WOM 
valence on WOM volume. A notable exception is that Dellarocas, Awad, and Zhang (2008) 
considers the interplay between WOM valence and WOM volume. They find a positive 
influence of WOM valence on WOM volume, which in turn influences retail sales. The 
explanation is that higher average rating indicates more of the community members 
agree with the consumer’s assessment of the product, which encourages him or her to 
distribute WOM to enhance self-esteem (Sundaram et al. 1998; Wangenheim et al.2003).   
However, Dellarocas et al. (2008) did not consider the effect of valence on positive WOM 
volume and negative WOM volume separately.  Previous studies suggest that consumers’ 
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online WOM are overwhelmingly positive (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2004).  Therefore, we 
expect that a higher average rating will lead to more positive and overall WOM volume 
and less negative WOM volume.  However, a consumer adopt a product with low average 
rating will be less likely to post review online due to self-esteem.  
Promotion cues: video and screenshots 
Consumers who search and shop for products are generally exposed to a number of 
promotional cues. In the case of mobile apps store, most of developers will provide some 
screenshots or a YouTube video or both to show the content of their applications. These 
promotional cues can activate associated concepts in consumers’ memory and making 
them more accessible (Higgins, Rholes, and Jones 1977; Lynch and Scrull 1982; Brakus, 
Bernd and Zarantonello, 2009) during the process of making purchase decision or 
spreading WOM. In other words, these cues are designed to increase the likelihood of 
retrieval of contents of the ad memory trace during brand decisions. If positive, these 
cues should result in more favorable brand evaluations and an increased likelihood of 
purchase (Keller, 2009) and eventually lead to more online WOM volume.  In addition, a 
product with more promotional cues may indicate that the marketers are more devoted 
to their products and have more resources to create a better product.  Therefore, the 
promotional cues, to some extent, can also act as cues of product quality.  More 
promotional cues may thus result in high customer satisfaction, which, hence, encourages 
the discussion among users.  
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3.2.3 Effects of Other Apps  
In choosing among competing products, consumers are faced with uncertainty of product 
performance. Although price and average rating can serve as important proxies of 
product quality, brand reputation could also signal the quality of products (Dawar and 
Parker 1994; Rao and Monroe 1989; Grewal, Krishnan, Baker, and Borin 1998). A mobile 
developer with more products is more likely to develop a better product in the future, 
since they may gain lots of experience and skills from the process of developing other 
products.  In addition, the more products the developer release into the market, the 
larger user base they have.  Current user base may spread WOM, which may increase 
brand awareness, and eventually encourage more people to discuss it.  Moreover, 
consumers may perceive a product to have higher performance if the developers’ 
products are generally sold at a premium price.  
3.2.4 User Base and online WOM   
A salient characteristic of the data used by our study is that the reviews and ratings are 
provided by actual users of applications. In other words, if users want to express their 
opinions in the app store, they must first download the applications. Duan, Gu, and 
Whinston (2008) suggests that the larger the pool of consumers who have experienced a 
movie, the more WOM will be generated, which is, to some extent, consistent with 
studies of product diffusion, which indicate that internal influence is mainly determined 
by the number of consumers who have experienced the products (Mahajan, Muller, and 
Wind, 2000). In the study of Duan et al. (2008), movie sales are used as a proxy for the 
number of consumers. The results suggest that the number of consumers has positive 
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influence on the volume of online WOM. We, therefore, expect that use base will have 
significant positive influence on the volume of online WOM. 
To empirically test the effect of price on online WOM in pure digital markets under 
the context of extreme competition, we collect a dataset from a famous App Store and a 
log-normal regression model was implemented in Bayesian paradigm. A number of other 
factors, such as the categories of apps, app content rating, brand reputation, and 
competition from other similar applications were controlled. To control unobserved 
heterogeneity of developers, random intercept and random coefficient model were 
implemented in Bayesian paradigm. Results indicate that the negative effect of price on 
online WOM is spurious without considering the influence of user base.  Contrary to 
intuition apparent among practitioners, free apps are less likely to generate interest 
among users. Users are more interested in discuss the products that they actually paid 
for.  Effects of other factors are found.  
3.3 Data description 
2,422 applications were collected from Google Play Store on Oct. 28, 2012. There are two 
main features of our data: (1) The data has a hierarchical structure. The first level is the 
application-level. The second level is developer-level. The total 2,422 apps are nested 
under 248 developers. There are 11 Application-level factors and 3 Developer-level 
factors. (2) The website of data source requires that all the reviewers download the 
applications before they rate the applications. The variable definitions and summary 
statistics were displayed in Table III-1 to Table III-3.  
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3.3.1 Dependent Variable 
Review Counts  
“Total Review Counts” measures the total review counts of each application. From Table 
III-2, we can see that the range of review counts is very large – 1,429,000, and it is heavily 
right-skewed.    “Positive Review Counts” measures the volume of positive total WOM, 
including all the ratings of “star 5”.  The positive review counts are also strongly right-
skewed. The range is 1,131,000.  “Negative Review Counts” measures the volume of 
negative total WOM, including all the ratings of “star 1” and “star 2”. The negative counts 
are strongly right skewed as well. However, the range is smaller than that of “positive 
review counts” and “total review counts” – 89,640.  We are more conservative in the 
designation of a review as positive because empirical evidence (Chevalier and Mayzlin, 
2006) suggests that consumer reviews tend to be overwhelmingly positive. We, therefore, 
designate a review as positive only if the reviewer gives the highest possible rating to an 
application. On the other hand, ratings that are extremely negative (for example, a rating 
of “star 1”), or close to being extremely negative (e.g., a rating of “star 2”), are designate 
as negative since there is little empirical evidence of consumers being overly negative. 
Hence, extremely negative, or close to being so, are both designate as negative ratings.  
Downloads 
The number of downloads is obtained as the range of downloads rather than the absolute 
number. For instance, the number of downloads in last 30 days of “Slot Machine” is 
5,000,000-10,000,000 up to Oct. 28, 2012. There are 12 categories in total. From lower 
right corner of Table III-2, we can see the distributions of downloads. There are 440 apps 
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whose downloads ranged from 100,000-500,000. And the second largest number of 
installs falls into the range of 10,000-50,000 – 409 apps. The distribution of installs is close 
to a normal distribution. 
3.3.2 Independent Variables 
Price 
The price of application is different from other continuous variable. 1487(61.40%) 
applications are free and therefore the price is “0”. The rest of it (935 applications) are 
paid applications and the range of price for paid ones is $7.99. The distribution of price 
for paid applications is roughly normally distributed. Given the intrinsic attributes of price, 
we recode the measures of price as dummy variable. The free apps are coded as “zeroes” 
and paid applications as “ones”.   
Average rating:    
“Average Rating” measures the valence of online review for each application. The average 
rating is overwhelmingly positive. Most applications receive an average rating of 4 or 
above.   
Promotional cues: Number of Screenshots and Video 
“numscrn” measures the number of Screenshots of each application. If you go the 
webpage of a certain application, it usually will display several screenshots to 
demonstrate the content of the product. The range of the number of screenshots is 8 and 
it is roughly normal distributed. “video” means whether there’s YouTube Video 
embedded on the webpage of the App, acting as a promotional cue for it. There are 772 
applications YouTube video on their website.  
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Other attributes of product 
“Content Rating” measures the maturity level of the application content. There are four 
different levels, everyone, low maturity (lm), medium maturity (mm), and high maturity 
(hm). 1,235 applications are made for everyone (50.99%). “Category” indicates the type 
of the applications. There are eight types of applications: arcade, brain, cards, casual, 
racing, sport, wallpaper, and widget. Arcade and wallpaper are the largest two types of 
applications.  “File Size” measures the installation space needed by the applications. 
Applications of larger file size usually contain more features and functionalities.  
Effects of Competition 
On the webpage of each application, Google Play will feature some other applications on 
the left-hand side. It usually lists four applications viewed by the same users and four 
other applications installed by the same users. Those applications are competing users 
with the focal app. Therefore, we create four variables based on the information of the 
above two types of products. Specifically, we calculate the average counts and price for 
both groups of applications and lead to the following four variables.  
Table III-1 Description of four Competition Measures 
Variable Name Description  
vvc Average Counts of the Apps Viewed by similar Users 
vvp Average price of the Apps Viewed by similar Users 
ivc Average Counts of the Apps Installed by similar Users 
ivp Average Price of the Apps Installed by similar Users 
 
Table III-2 Summary Statistics of Application-Level Attributes 
 Min. 1st Qu Median Mean 3rd Qu Max. 
Total review counts 1 54 450 14217 4243 1429241 
Positive review  0 32 263 10110 2506 1131000 
Negative review  0 7 60 868 469 89640 
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rating 0.000 3.900 4.200 4.001 4.500 5.000 
price 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.818 0.990 7.990 
numscrn 0 3 5 4.617 5 8 
filesize 0.006 1.900 5.700 16.890 14.000 1843.000 
vvc 0 3833 14364 35814 44295 754480 
vvp 0.000 0.000 0.740 0.955 1.480 8.310 
ivc 0 54 121 1256 430 131171 
ivp 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.832 1.590 8.070 
Categorical Variables Downloads (Dependent Variable) 
Variable name 
# of 
Apps Percentage Range of Downloads 
# of Apps Percentage 
Arcade 386 15.94% <100 102 4.21% 
Brain 280 11.56% 100 - 500 148 6.11% 
Cards 33 1.36% 500 - 1,000 78 3.22% 
Casual 373 15.40% 1,000 - 5,000 250 10.32% 
Racing 228 9.41% 5,000 - 10,000 160 6.61% 
Sport 336 13.87% 10,000 - 50,000 409 16.89% 
Wallpaper  360 14.86% 50,000 - 100,000 185 7.64% 
Widget 126 5.20% 100,000 - 500,000 440 18.17% 
Video-yes 772 31.87% 500,000 - 1,000,000 174 7.18% 
Video-no 1650 68.13% 1,000,000 - 5,000,000 342 14.12% 
Everyone  1235 50.99% 5,000,000 - 10,000,000 76 3.14% 
High maturity  223 9.21% >10,000,000 58 2.39% 
Low maturity  523 21.59%     
Medium maturity 441 18.21%     
Note: “nums” represents number of screen shots 
 
Effects of Other Apps 
To account for the heterogeneity of developers, we create three developer-level 
attributes: 
“dac” is the total number of the applications display on Google Play and installed 
by the same this developer. Therefore, this variable measures, to some extent, the size of 
each developer. We can see the range is 67. The distribution of developer size is right-
skewed. Most of developers has 28 or less applications.  
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“dvc” is the average number of review counts of those applications developed by 
the same developer. The range of the average review counts is 294,800. And again, the 
distribution of it is roughly normally distributed but a little bit right-skewed.    
“dvp” is the average price of applications developed by the same developer. The 
range of it is 5.37 and it is also roughly normally distributed.  
The correlations between the three developer-level variables are relatively low so 
we don’t have to worry about multicollinearity problem.   
Table III-3 Summary Statistics of Developer-Level Attributes 
Correlation Matrix Summary Statistics 
 dac dvc dvp Min.    1st Qu. Median  Mean    3rd Qu. Max.    
dac 1.000 -0.425 -0.046 5.00 12.00 28.00 31.970 49.00 72.00 
dvc  1.000 -0.092 1 127 988 11460 8908 294800 
dvp   1.000 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.60 0.93 5.37 
3.4 Model Specification 
Our dependent variable is the number of online reviews. Since the variability of counts is 
huge, the ordinary count models, such as Poisson regression, Binomial regression, and 
Negative Binomial regression are not appropriate. In addition, the dependent variable is 
strongly right-skewed. Therefore, we adopt a log-normal regression to empirically test 
the issue:  
Model 11: Log-Normal regression  
The dependent variable in this model is the total number of online reviews. Since the 
measures are positive and strongly right-skewed, we use the log-transformed version of 
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the variable. Both application-level variables and developer-level variables were simply 
included in the basic model.  The results of this model were displayed in table III-4.  
Log(𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗) 
= 𝛽1 log(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽2𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3 log(𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽4 log(𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽5lm𝑖𝑗 +
𝛽6ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽7𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽8𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽9𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽10𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽11𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗 +
𝛽12𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽13𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽14𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽15 log(𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗)                
+𝛽16 log(𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽17 log(𝑣𝑣𝑝𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽18 log(𝑖𝑣𝑐𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽19 log(𝑖𝑣𝑝𝑖𝑗)                                          
+𝛼1 log(𝑑𝑎𝑐𝑗) + 𝛼2 log(𝑑𝑣𝑐𝑗) + 𝛼3 log(𝑑𝑣𝑝𝑗)                     
         
Where, 
𝑖 represents application 1 to application 2422; 
𝑗 represents developer 1 to develop 248;                     
In the above equation, the log of the total review counts is related to an 
applications intrinsic attributes, average rating, competition, and developers’ experience 
and skills. Note that our data has a hierarchical structure (i.e., applications are nested 
under developers). However, this model did not consider the heterogeneity of 
developers. We assumed independence of applications and pooled all the applications 
together.   
Model 12: Log-Normal regression with User base 
In the above model, we ignore the influence of user base on the number of online reviews.  
According to previous studies, a larger use base would generate more sales revenues and 
online WOM volume for the marketers in the future. To account for the effect of user 
base, we add the number of downloads to the model as a continuous explanatory 
variable.  The results of this model were displayed in table III-5.  
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Log(𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗) 
= 𝛽1 log(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽2𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3 log(𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽4 log(𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽5lm𝑖𝑗 +
𝛽6ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽7𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽8𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽9𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽10𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽11𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗 +
𝛽12𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽13𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽14𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽15 log(𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗)                
+𝛽16 log(𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽17 log(𝑣𝑣𝑝𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽18 log(𝑖𝑣𝑐𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽19 log(𝑖𝑣𝑝𝑖𝑗) +
𝛽20 log(𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑗)                                          
+𝛼1 log(𝑑𝑎𝑐𝑗) + 𝛼2 log(𝑑𝑣𝑐𝑗) + 𝛼3 log(𝑑𝑣𝑝𝑗)                     
         
Where, 
𝑖 represents application 1 to application 2422; 
𝑗 represents developer 1 to develop 248;                     
Model 13:  Log-Normal Regression on Rates 
There is an important characteristic of online reviews for applications posted by users. 
Users have to first download the application if they want to express their opinions online. 
In this regard, it is different from movies or other entertainment goods, where some 
people may post reviews based on their impressions about the movie trailers or 
commercials before they actually experience the product. In mobile app market, online 
WOM is generated by the actual user of the application.  Therefore, a relevant question 
is: what is the probability that a user posts a review for the product after using it? 
Therefore, instead of modeling total number of reviews directly, we regress on the ratio 
of the total number of reviews posted for the product to the number of downloads. The 
model can describe how the ratio depends on the explanatory variables, such as price, 
competition, and developers’ experience and skills. We then specify the following model, 
where the dependent variable is the ratio of total review counts and total downloads of 
applications.  The results of this model are displayed in table III-6.  
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Log(
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑗
) 
= 𝛽1 log(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽2𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3 log(𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽4 log(𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽5lm𝑖𝑗 +
𝛽6ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽7𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽8𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽9𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽10𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽11𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗 +
𝛽12𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽13𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽14𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽15 log(𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗)                
+𝛽16 log(𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽17 log(𝑣𝑣𝑝𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽18 log(𝑖𝑣𝑐𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽19 log(𝑖𝑣𝑝𝑖𝑗)                                          
+𝛼1 log(𝑑𝑎𝑐𝑗) + 𝛼2 log(𝑑𝑣𝑐𝑗) + 𝛼3 log(𝑑𝑣𝑝𝑗)                             
 
Where, 
𝑖 represents application 1 to application 2422; 
𝑗 represents developer 1 to develop 248;                     
Model 22: Log-Normal Regression Model with Random Intercepts 
In the previous analysis, we pooled all applications together, and made the assumption 
that one application is independent from another. However, our data structure suggests 
that applications developed by the same developer may have some common 
characteristics. To account for the hierarchical data structure, we introduce a developer-
specific parameter 𝜂𝑗 to the utility function. Therefore, we have our second model:  
Level 1:  
Log(
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑗
) 
= 𝛽1 log(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽2𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3 log(𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽4 log(𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽5lm𝑖𝑗 +
𝛽6ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽7𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽8𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽9𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽10𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽11𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗 +
𝛽12𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽13𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽14𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽15 log(𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗)                
+𝛽16 log(𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽17 log(𝑣𝑣𝑝𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽18 log(𝑖𝑣𝑐𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽19 log(𝑖𝑣𝑝𝑖𝑗)                                          
+𝛼1 log(𝑑𝑎𝑐𝑗) + 𝛼2 log(𝑑𝑣𝑐𝑗) + 𝛼3 log(𝑑𝑣𝑝𝑗)        
+𝜂𝑗         
Level 2:  
𝜂𝑗~𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(𝜇. 𝜂𝑗 , 𝜎. 𝜂) 
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𝜇. 𝜂𝑗 = 𝛼1 log(𝑑𝑎𝑐𝑗) + 𝛼2log (𝑑𝑣𝑐𝑗) + 𝛼3log (𝑑𝑣𝑝𝑗) 
To further account for developer heterogeneity, we allow random effects in both 
intercepts and application-level slopes. Therefore, we have our third model:  
Model 32: Log-Normal Regression Model with Random Coefficients (without 
correlation) 
In the Random Coefficient Model, we assume there are J separate slopes for each variable 
which follow a normal distribution. Therefore, random coefficient model can capture 
heterogeneity among developers as well. We also add a random component  𝛿𝑖𝑗, which 
can capture unobserved heterogeneity among applications.  The results of this model are 
displayed in table III-7.  
Level 1: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑗
)
= 𝛽𝑗,1 log(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽𝑗,2𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗,3 log(𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽𝑗,4 log(𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗)
+ 𝛽𝑗,5lm𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗,6ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗,7𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗,8𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗,9𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗,10𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽𝑗,11𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗,12𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗,13𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗,14𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽𝑗,15 log(𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗) 
+𝛽𝑗,16 log(𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽𝑗,17 log(𝑣𝑣𝑝𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽𝑗,18 log(𝑖𝑣𝑐𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽𝑗,19 log(𝑖𝑣𝑝𝑖𝑗) 
+𝛼1 log(𝑑𝑎𝑐𝑗) + 𝛼2log (𝑑𝑣𝑐𝑗) + 𝛼3log (𝑑𝑣𝑝𝑗) 
+𝜂𝑗  
Level 2:  
𝛽𝑗𝑘~𝑑𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚(𝜇. 𝛽𝑘, 𝜏. 𝛽𝑘), 𝑘 = 1,2, …20 
𝜂𝑗~𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(𝜇. 𝜂𝑗 , 𝜎. 𝜂) 
𝜇. 𝜂𝑗 = 𝛼1 log(𝑑𝑎𝑐𝑗) + 𝛼2log (𝑑𝑣𝑐𝑗) + 𝛼3log (𝑑𝑣𝑝𝑗) 
65 
 
 
 
Model 42: Log-Normal Regression Model with Random Coefficients (with correlation) 
In the above specification, although we assume random coefficients, we allow the 
coefficients to be independent, thus ignoring the correlation between variables. In the 
next specification, we assume that the coefficients are correlated. Therefore, the model 
can not only capture part of heterogeneity among developers, but also the correlation 
between variables. 
Level 1: 
Log(
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑗
) 
= 𝛽𝑗,1 log(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽𝑗,2𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗,3 log(𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽𝑗,4 log(𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽𝑗,5lm𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽𝑗,6ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗,7𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗,8𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗,9𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗,10𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽𝑗,11𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗,12𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗,13𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗,14𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽𝑗,15 log(𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗) 
+𝛽𝑗,16 log(𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽𝑗,17 log(𝑣𝑣𝑝𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽𝑗,18 log(𝑖𝑣𝑐𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽𝑗,19 log(𝑖𝑣𝑝𝑖𝑗) 
+𝜂𝑗 + 𝛿𝑖𝑗  
  
𝛽𝑗𝑘⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑ 
⃐⃑ ⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑
~𝑑𝑚𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚(𝜇. 𝛽𝑘⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑  ⃑, 𝑇), 𝑘 = 1,2, …19 
𝑇~𝑤𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅, 𝜐) 
𝜇. 𝛽𝑘⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑  ⃑~𝑑𝑚𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚(𝑚𝑛. 𝛽𝑘⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑  ⃑, 𝐵) 
 
𝜂𝑗~𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(𝜇. 𝜂𝑗 , 𝜏𝜂) 
𝜇. 𝜂𝑗 = 𝛼1 log(𝑑𝑎𝑐𝑗) + 𝛼2log (𝑑𝑣𝑐𝑗) + 𝛼3log (𝑑𝑣𝑝𝑗) 
𝛼𝑚~𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(0,0.001) 
𝜏𝜂~𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎(0.001,0.001) 
𝛿𝑖𝑗~𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(0, 𝜎) 
𝜎~𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎(0.001,0.001) 
66 
 
 
 
To fit the proposed models, we take a Bayesian Approach to estimate parameters. 
For all models, we assume diffuse priors and run a Markov Chain Monte Carlo sampler for 
5,000 iteration which serves as a burn-in period. We then obtain inferences from 
posterior samples from the next 20,000 iterations.  
3.5 Empirical Results 
Table III-4 reports posterior mean estimates of implementing model on total number of 
reviews. There are many findings.  First, without considering the influence of user base, 
price (𝛽1 = −0.3243) and file size (𝛽4 = −0.1126) have significantly negative influence 
on total number of reviews. In other words, consumers are more likely to post reviews 
for free applications and applications of smaller size.  Second, having YouTube video (𝛽2 =
0.3994) and number of screenshots (𝛽3 = 0.1592) will significantly boost volume of 
online WOM.  Third, number of applications developed by the developer (𝛼1 = 0.1528), 
average review counts (𝛼2 = 1.5970) of the applications developed by the developer, 
average rating counts (𝛽15 = 0.3534), and having higher maturity content (𝛽5 = 0.8174; 
𝛽6 = 1.3460; 𝛽7 = 0.7749), will significantly increase total number of reviews. However, 
applications with high maturity content turn to be not significant after controlling for 
developer heterogeneity.  Fourth, after controlling for developer heterogeneity, average 
rating (𝛽16 = 0.0821) and price (𝛽17 = 0.1885) of the applications featured as “viewed 
by other users”, average counts (𝛽18 = 0.5375) featured as “installed by other users”, 
have significantly positive influence on total review counts. However, average price 
(𝛽19 = −0.8873) of applications featured as “installed by other users” has significantly 
negative influence on total review counts.  
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Table III-5 reports posterior mean estimates of implementing the model on total 
number of reviews. However, in this model, the number of downloads was included as an 
explanatory variable.  According to DIC score, we know the second model fits better than 
the first one. By simply adding the variable of user base, we can see many of our findings 
of model 1 are spurious. 
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Table III-4 Posterior means of the Lognormal Regression  
 Lognormal regression random intercept random coefficient - uncorrelated random coefficient - correlated 
 mean 2.50% 97.50% mean 2.50% 97.50% mean 2.50% 97.50% mean 2.50% 97.50% 
𝛼1 0.1528** 0.0308 0.2784 4.0320** 3.3950 4.672 3.1450** 2.5070 3.8400 3.8960** 3.2220 4.5470 
𝛼2 1.5970** 1.4970 1.6950 3.0930** 2.6340 3.556 2.7300** 2.3130 3.1870 3.1060** 2.6340 3.5800 
𝛼3 0.0248 -0.0806 0.1303 0.4520 -0.0135 0.9299 0.1477 -0.2486 0.5517 0.3324 -0.1098 0.7645 
𝛽1 -0.3243** -0.6109 -0.0354 -2.1400** -2.3740 -1.894 -1.9800** -2.2880 -1.6700 -2.0300** -2.3160 -1.7260 
𝛽2 0.3994** 0.2280 0.5716 0.6624** 0.4918 0.8425 0.6986** 0.4541 0.9593 0.6689** 0.4388 0.8969 
𝛽3 0.0840 -0.0035 0.1710 0.1592** 0.0732 0.2528 0.1770** 0.0348 0.3249 0.1789** 0.0458 0.3116 
𝛽4 -0.1126** -0.1866 -0.0378 -0.0840** -0.1544 -0.01054 -0.0426 -0.1531 0.0775 -0.0434 -0.1596 0.0660 
𝛽5 0.8174** 0.6350 1.0010 0.2866** 0.1075 0.4723 0.3260** 0.1053 0.5471 0.3238** 0.1309 0.5117 
𝛽6 1.3460** 1.0680 1.6230 0.3642 -0.0175 0.7385 0.3266 -0.1443 0.8229 0.3183 -0.1267 0.7550 
𝛽7 0.7749** 0.5384 1.0100 0.3827** 0.1461 0.6102 0.4281** 0.1329 0.7140 0.4145** 0.1456 0.6857 
𝛽8 5.4820** 5.1890 5.7720 1.8810** 1.4520 2.307 3.0000** 2.3590 3.6320 1.9650** 1.5390 2.4380 
𝛽9 5.5310** 5.2510 5.8090 1.8750** 1.4060 2.336 2.9490** 2.2700 3.6040 1.9410** 1.4710 2.4410 
𝛽10 4.6430** 4.3560 4.9400 1.0660** 0.5863 1.542 2.1440** 1.4130 2.8200 1.2180** 0.7452 1.8970 
𝛽11 5.2440** 4.9850 5.5080 1.6130** 1.1740 2.055 2.7530** 2.0590 3.3990 1.6860** 1.2500 2.2370 
𝛽12 4.8890** 4.6030 5.1780 1.2190** 0.7631 1.664 2.0630** 1.4360 2.7120 1.1660** 0.7546 1.6180 
𝛽13 4.7450** 4.4860 5.0030 1.2220** 0.7606 1.66 2.2390** 1.6160 2.8630 1.2890** 0.8521 1.7750 
𝛽14 3.9170** 3.6460 4.1920 0.3399 -0.0134 0.7106 0.7623** 0.2296 1.3440 0.3282 -0.0513 0.7482 
𝛽15 0.3534** 0.2861 0.4217 0.2035** 0.1438 0.2593 0.3555** 0.1851 0.5983 0.3346** 0.1699 0.5272 
𝛽16 0.0294 -0.0446 0.1030 0.0821** 0.0203 0.1423 0.1028** 0.0224 0.1854 0.1107** 0.0319 0.1922 
𝛽17 0.1459** 0.0673 0.2236 0.1885** 0.1267 0.2479 0.1817** 0.0954 0.2671 0.1917** 0.1082 0.2744 
𝛽18 0.5982** 0.5157 0.6817 0.5375** 0.4677 0.6078 0.5817** 0.4776 0.6890 0.5805** 0.4800 0.6807 
𝛽19 -0.8837** -1.0150 -0.7523 -0.3172** -0.4294 -0.2115 -0.3203** -0.4458 -0.1832 -0.2986** -0.4270 -0.1720 
𝜎 1.7840 1.7330 1.8340 1.2450 1.2070 1.284 1.0180 0.9762 1.0630 1.0240 0.9839 1.0690 
𝜎𝜂       3.4840 3.1000 3.916 2.7250 2.2540 3.2330 3.3400 2.9160 3.7910 
DIC   39220   37730   37320   37280 
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First, the user base (𝛽20 = 0.6312) obviously has significantly positive influence 
on the volume of online WOM, which is consistent with the results of Duan, Gu, and 
Whinston(2008), i.e., the larger the pool of user base, the more WOM will be generated.    
Second, the negative influence of price on volume of online WOM became smaller. 
Additionally, after controlling for both observed and unobserved heterogeneity of 
developers, price (𝛽1 = 0.0979) does not have significant negative impact on online 
WOM anymore. In this sense, free applications may attract many people to install but not 
necessarily generate more online WOM.    Third, the influence of file size (𝛽4 = 0.1791) 
became positive in this model, which is consistent with our expectation. The larger the 
file size, the more interesting it is. Based on previous research, consumers are more likely 
express their opinions for interesting products.    Fourth, the influence of number of 
applications (𝛼1 = −0.1538) developed by the developer turns out to significantly reduce 
volume of online WOM. In this sense, developers’ reputation and experience suppress 
users’ intention to spread their WOM online.   However, users are more likely to talk 
about those applications developed by developers with less reputation or public visibility.   
The finding that the more users the application has, the more posts it will receive, 
seems to be supported at this point. However, it cannot fully account for the unique 
attribute of our dataset, i.e., the volume of online WOM comes from the actual user of 
the applications. Therefore, we are more interesting the probability that the user post 
their opinions online after they experience the product. We therefore, take the 
probability of posting opinions online as outcome and implement the lognormal 
regression in Bayesian paradigm.    
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Table III-5 Posterior means of the Lognormal Model with downloads included as an IV 
 Lognormal Regression With Random Intercept With Random Coefficient 
 mean val2.5pc val97.5pc mean val2.5pc val97.5pc mean val2.5pc val97.5pc 𝜎𝛽 
𝛼1 -0.1538** -0.2075 -0.1009 -0.2041** -0.3066 -0.1051 -0.7231** -0.9423 -0.4960  
𝛼2 0.7168** 0.6709 0.7630 0.6657** 0.5901 0.7366 0.3116** 0.1526 0.4658  
𝛼3 0.2242** 0.1790 0.2702 0.2613** 0.1953 0.3273 0.2880** 0.1245 0.4526  
𝛽1 -0.2136** -0.3335 -0.0897 -0.1790** -0.2999 -0.0559 -0.0657 -0.2316 0.0979 0.3957 
𝛽2 0.1203** 0.0905 0.1496 0.0740** 0.0447 0.1033 0.2787** 0.1050 0.6112 0.3761 
𝛽3 0.0439** 0.0075 0.0805 0.0789** 0.0363 0.1216 0.0955** 0.0195 0.1673 0.2888 
𝛽4 0.1791** 0.1053 0.2527 0.1666** 0.0853 0.2508 0.1020 -0.0203 0.2330 0.3529 
𝛽5 0.0166 -0.0148 0.0479 0.0120 -0.0226 0.0472 0.0596 -0.0093 0.1336 0.2421 
𝛽6 0.0601** 0.0288 0.0910 0.0498** 0.0188 0.0813 0.0469 -0.0003 0.0913 0.1966 
𝛽7 0.0699** 0.0372 0.1033 0.0618** 0.0303 0.0936 0.0514** 0.0071 0.0979 0.1936 
𝛽8 0.2786** 0.2433 0.3146 0.2215** 0.1851 0.2578 0.1704** 0.1112 0.2263 0.2092 
𝛽9 0.0865** 0.0274 0.1448 0.0650** 0.0067 0.1226 0.0598 -0.0115 0.1379 0.2258 
𝛽10 0.0614 -0.0189 0.1405 0.0040 -0.0857 0.0912 0.0011 -0.1260 0.1194 0.2956 
𝛽11 0.1206** 0.0189 0.2201 0.0534 -0.0563 0.1648 0.0355 -0.1219 0.1945 0.3650 
𝛽12 0.1907** 0.0699 0.3099 0.0065 -0.1639 0.1772 -0.0476 -0.3189 0.2180 0.4422 
𝛽13 -0.1857** -0.3440 -0.0246 -0.4139** -0.5805 -0.2380 -0.5066** -0.7519 -0.2561 0.3493 
𝛽14 -0.3025** -0.4667 -0.1426 -0.5213** -0.6933 -0.3418 -0.6775** -0.9358 -0.4046 0.3986 
𝛽15 -0.3187** -0.4706 -0.1723 -0.5413** -0.7051 -0.3703 -0.6671** -0.9251 -0.4198 0.3641 
𝛽16 -0.5344** -0.6919 -0.3755 -0.7327** -0.9188 -0.5458 -0.8719** -1.1550 -0.5773 0.4865 
𝛽17 -0.6706** -0.8281 -0.5115 -0.8340** -1.0060 -0.6598 -0.8559** -1.0870 -0.6115 0.3758 
𝛽18 -0.7406** -0.8883 -0.5937 -0.8925** -1.0550 -0.7260 -0.9267** -1.1520 -0.6913 0.3919 
𝛽19 -0.6153** -0.7571 -0.4753 -0.5446** -0.6937 -0.3947 -0.5144** -0.7589 -0.2955 0.4318 
𝛽20 0.6312** 0.6194 0.6426 0.6612** 0.6483 0.6743 0.6950** 0.6720 0.7168 0.0922 
𝜎 0.7557 0.7346 0.7770 0.6741 0.6540 0.6946 0.5419 0.5190 0.5640  
𝜎𝜂    0.3815 0.3309 0.4371 0.3262 0.2396 0.4431  
𝐷𝐼𝐶 35060 34290 33430 
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Table III-6 reports the posterior mean estimates of this model. By considering the 
effect of total downloads in this way, the results turn out to be of much difference from 
that of simply implementing on the total number of review counts(table III-4) and adding 
user base as an explanatory  variable (table III-5). The DIC score has been largely reduced 
for this model. Many important findings were demonstrated in table III-6. 
First, after controlling for developer heterogeneity, price (𝛽1,2 = 1.0140 ) has 
significant positive influence on total review counts, holding downloads constant. 
Compared to the effect of price of simply implementing on total review counts, we can 
see the effect of price has been totally reversed. Price in this model, on the contrary of 
model 1, will significantly increase the probability of users posting their reviews online. In 
other words, users are more likely to talk about those applications that they actually 
bought from the store instead of free applications. Although applications having larger 
installation base will have more volume of online WOM based on results of model 2, in 
this sense, we argue that the freemium business model will not boost installation base 
through online WOM, but on the contrary, it boosts volume of online WOM through 
installation base. Results of model 3 further confirm this proposition. From the results of 
table III-6, we can see that users who download the applications are more likely to talk 
about paid applications instead of free ones. The result supports the idea that price 
determines the evaluation effort invested by consumers. A price premium can stimulate 
consumers to revisit their perception of benefit relevance, and thus, spread their opinions 
online (Wathieu and Bertini, 2007). Effects of other factors also are found different from 
that of model 1.  
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Table III-6 Posterior means of the Lognormal density regression 
 
Lognormal 
regression  random intercept  
random coefficient - 
uncorrelated random coefficient - correlated 
 mean 2.50% 97.50% mean 2.50% 97.50% mean 2.50% 97.50% mean 2.50% 97.50% 
𝛼1 -0.3287** -0.4115 -0.2434 -3.4640** -3.9520 -2.9820 -3.1450** -3.6300 -2.6800 -3.3550** -3.8370 -2.8890 
𝛼2 0.2053** 0.1377 0.2719 -1.0790** -1.4500 -0.7067 -0.9476** -1.3050 -0.6028 -1.0460** -1.4040 -0.6954 
𝛼3 0.3400** 0.2685 0.4116 -0.0109 -0.3784 0.3558 0.0946 -0.2425 0.4357 0.0342 -0.3259 0.3902 
𝛽1 -0.1508 -0.3454 0.0452 1.0140** 0.8830 1.1420 0.9487** 0.7669 1.1240 0.9318** 0.7602 1.1130 
𝛽2 0.0468 -0.0696 0.1636 0.0643 -0.0324 0.1595 -0.0234 -0.1515 0.0980 -0.0009 -0.1214 0.1208 
𝛽3 0.0217 -0.0378 0.0807 0.0744** 0.0240 0.1250 0.0828** 0.0013 0.1627 0.0826** 0.0060 0.1592 
𝛽4 0.0925** 0.0422 0.1432 0.0672** 0.0285 0.1072 0.1105** 0.0282 0.1973 0.1112** 0.0317 0.1937 
𝛽5 -0.3738** -0.4976 -0.2490 0.0239 -0.0760 0.1277 -0.0490 -0.1874 0.0865 -0.0214 -0.1481 0.1025 
𝛽6 -0.4832** -0.6720 -0.2955 0.0007 -0.2173 0.2132 -0.1058 -0.4186 0.2082 -0.0475 -0.3165 0.2336 
𝛽7 -0.2589** -0.4194 -0.0997 0.0654 -0.0666 0.1958 0.0092 -0.1691 0.1795 0.0477 -0.1144 0.2162 
𝛽8 -3.5040** -3.7030 -3.3070 -0.4824** -0.7126 -0.2506 -0.8751** -1.1810 -0.5663 -0.6047** -0.8657 -0.3429 
𝛽9 -3.7140** -3.9040 -3.5250 -0.5623** -0.8030 -0.3274 -1.0270** -1.3640 -0.6897 -0.7419** -1.0340 -0.4710 
𝛽10 -3.5630** -3.7580 -3.3620 -0.6023** -0.8723 -0.3204 -1.0160** -1.4450 -0.6191 -0.7024** -1.0270 -0.3717 
𝛽11 -3.5740** -3.7500 -3.3950 -0.4715** -0.7063 -0.2405 -0.9240** -1.2460 -0.5993 -0.6378** -0.9234 -0.3671 
𝛽12 -3.9240** -4.1170 -3.7270 -0.7480** -0.9830 -0.5122 -1.0500** -1.3550 -0.7340 -0.8121** -1.0760 -0.5493 
𝛽13 -3.9490** -4.1240 -3.7740 -0.7134** -0.9452 -0.4847 -1.0780** -1.3820 -0.7618 -0.8118** -1.0740 -0.5426 
𝛽14 -3.2640** -3.4480 -3.0770 -0.2083** -0.3966 -0.0257 -0.3847** -0.6489 -0.1235 -0.2654** -0.4927 -0.0547 
𝛽15 -0.0151 -0.0608 0.0313 0.0036 -0.0270 0.0352 0.1937** 0.0462 0.4325 0.1563** 0.0268 0.3072 
𝛽16 0.0775** 0.0273 0.1274 0.0391** 0.0056 0.0724 0.0366 -0.0112 0.0850 0.0373 -0.0102 0.0854 
𝛽17 0.0261 -0.0272 0.0789 -0.0172 -0.0509 0.0170 -0.0098 -0.0605 0.0395 -0.0107 -0.0577 0.0366 
𝛽18 0.0919** 0.0359 0.1485 0.0417** 0.0036 0.0789 -0.0125 -0.0722 0.0461 -0.0045 -0.0617 0.0521 
𝛽19 0.6564** 0.5675 0.7455 0.1569** 0.0972 0.2175 0.1582** 0.0811 0.2439 0.1727** 0.0927 0.2562 
𝜏 0.6830 0.6452 0.7228 2.1110 1.9830 2.2420 2.9490 2.7320 3.1850 2.9110 2.7000 3.1320 
𝜏𝜂     0.1230 0.0996 0.1490 0.1572 0.1232 0.1955 0.1369 0.1097 0.1688 
DIC   -11860   -14350   -14560   -14590 
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Second, the number of screenshot (𝛽32 = 0.0744 ), average rating (𝛽15,3 =
0.1937 ), and file size(𝛽42 = 0.0672 )  have significantly POSITIVE influence on the 
probability of users posting their reviews, which are consistent with our expectation.    
Third, after controlling for developer heterogeneity, number of applications 
developed by the developer ( 𝛼11 = −0.3287 ) will significantly decrease users’ 
probability of posting their reviews online. The average review counts(𝛼21 = 0.2053)   of 
the applications developed by the developer will significantly increase users’ probability 
of posting their reviews online.  
Fourth, applications with high maturity content will not help to significantly boost 
users’ probability of expressing their opinions online after controlling for developer 
heterogeneity.  
             Fifth, after controlling for developer heterogeneity, average price of applications 
featured as “installed by other users” ( 𝛽19,3 = 0.1582 ) has significantly POSITIVE 
influence on total review counts.  However, the effect of three competition variables, i.e., 
average counts and price of applications featured as “viewed by other users” and average 
counts of applications featured as “installed by other users” become not significant.  
Sixth, the effect of average rating remains positive and significant after controlling 
for developers’ heterogeneity. In this sense, applications with higher average rating are 
more likely to be talked by users. Therefore, it is of much importance for us to explore 
why users will give positive ratings. Since the more positive ratings the application 
receives, the higher the average rating. In addition, based on previous research, negative 
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WOM has more impact than that of positive WOM. Therefore, examining the influence of 
negative volume of online WOM is even more important. Table III-7 and table III-8 report 
the results of the effects of factors on both negative and positive volume of online WOM. 
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Table III-7 Posterior means of the model on log(negative counts/downloads) 
 Lognormal regression random intercept random coefficient - uncorrelated 
random coefficient - 
correlated 
 mean 2.50% 97.50% mean 2.50% 97.50% mean 2.50% 97.50% mean 2.50% 97.50% 
𝛼1 -0.3298** -0.4350 -0.2214 -5.1370** -5.8330 -4.4470 -4.5940** -5.2370 -3.9570 -4.7530** -5.4210 -4.1080 
𝛼2 -0.1403** -0.2262 -0.0554 -2.1040** -2.6510 -1.5800 -1.7470** -2.2510 -1.2580 -1.8360** -2.3510 -1.3380 
𝛼3 0.4248** 0.3336 0.5159 -0.1648 -0.7072 0.3777 -0.0642 -0.5491 0.4222 -0.0737 -0.5678 0.4136 
𝛽1 -0.3569** -0.6039 -0.1078 1.3900** 1.2500 1.5300 1.2610** 1.0670 1.4520 1.2280** 1.0430 1.4130 
𝛽2 -0.1999** -0.3478 -0.0513 -0.1440** -0.2464 -0.0384 -0.1262** -0.2520 -0.0025 -0.1160 -0.2337 0.0049 
𝛽3 -0.1060** -0.1816 -0.0309 0.0143 -0.0381 0.0689 0.0173 -0.0604 0.0976 0.0150 -0.0605 0.0865 
𝛽4 0.1242** 0.0603 0.1887 0.0515** 0.0078 0.0943 0.1096** 0.0271 0.1979 0.1087** 0.0272 0.1893 
𝛽5 -0.5250** -0.6822 -0.3664 0.0494 -0.0565 0.1574 -0.0353 -0.1695 0.1005 -0.0165 -0.1476 0.1104 
𝛽6 -1.0470** -1.2870 -0.8079 0.0508 -0.1787 0.2776 -0.0441 -0.3499 0.2598 -0.0127 -0.2859 0.2897 
𝛽7 -0.4323** -0.6363 -0.2297 0.1315 -0.0027 0.2688 0.0486 -0.1300 0.2297 0.0722 -0.1035 0.2450 
𝛽8 -5.1380** -5.3900 -4.8870 -0.5530** -0.7877 -0.3131 -0.7396** -1.0220 -0.4475 -0.5919** -0.9166 -0.2998 
𝛽9 -5.7060** -5.9480 -5.4660 -0.7985** -1.0600 -0.5486 -1.0120** -1.3190 -0.7077 -0.8595** -1.2060 -0.5659 
𝛽10 -5.1340** -5.3820 -4.8780 -0.6252** -0.8939 -0.3625 -0.7869** -1.1840 -0.4103 -0.6362** -1.0060 -0.2914 
𝛽11 -5.1660** -5.3900 -4.9380 -0.4812** -0.7225 -0.2427 -0.7336** -1.0310 -0.4251 -0.5790** -0.9115 -0.2753 
𝛽12 -5.2280** -5.4740 -4.9790 -0.5630** -0.8108 -0.3244 -0.7456** -1.0250 -0.4523 -0.6362** -0.9422 -0.3355 
𝛽13 -5.2850** -5.5080 -5.0630 -0.5830** -0.8361 -0.3474 -0.7937** -1.0630 -0.4982 -0.6508** -0.9568 -0.3403 
𝛽14 -4.7230** -4.9570 -4.4860 -0.1783 -0.3764 0.0261 -0.1820 -0.4335 0.0760 -0.1691 -0.4844 0.0813 
𝛽15 -0.2511** -0.3092 -0.1921 -0.1601** -0.1937 -0.1267 -3.0760** -3.7540 -2.4280 -2.5280** -3.1370 -1.9420 
𝛽16 0.0741** 0.0103 0.1376 0.0126 -0.0243 0.0494 0.0089 -0.0393 0.0580 0.0085 -0.0392 0.0579 
𝛽17 0.0208 -0.0470 0.0878 -0.0252 -0.0614 0.0104 -0.0072 -0.0580 0.0415 -0.0080 -0.0549 0.0370 
𝛽18 0.0760** 0.0048 0.1480 -0.0018 -0.0426 0.0392 -0.0390 -0.0996 0.0223 -0.0307 -0.0880 0.0289 
𝛽19 0.9174** 0.8044 1.0310 0.1891** 0.1241 0.2516 0.1506** 0.0730 0.2365 0.1632** 0.0833 0.2492 
𝜎 1.5390 1.4950 1.5830 0.7324 0.7107 0.7549 0.5717 0.5491 0.5938 0.5782 0.5565 0.6021 
𝜎𝜂       4.2370 3.8660 4.6630 3.6920 3.3460 4.0780 3.8690 3.4840 4.2780 
DIC   -20120   -23470   -24020   -24030 
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Table III-7 reports the posterior mean estimates of implementing the models on 
ratio of total NEGATIVE review counts over lower bound of downloads.  
First, average rating (𝛽15 = −0.2511) will significantly decrease the total number 
of negative review counts, even after controlling developer heterogeneity. Number of 
applications developed by the developer (𝛼1 = −0.3289), average counts of applications 
developed by the developer ( 𝛼2 = −0.1403 ), and having YouTube video ( 𝛽2 =
−0.1999), will also significantly decrease negative review counts.  
Second, after controlling for developer heterogeneity, price (𝛽1,2 = 1.3900), file 
size (𝛽4,2 = 0.0515), and average price of applications featured as “installed by other 
users” (𝛽19,2 = 0.1891), will significantly increase the number of negative review counts.   
Table III-8 reports the posterior mean estimates of implementing the models on 
ratio of total POSITIVE review counts over lower bound of downloads.  
First, price ( 𝛽1 = 1.0420 ), average rating ( 𝛽15,3 = 2.7900 ), number of 
screenshots (𝛽3 = 0.0834), and file size (𝛽4 = 0.0898), and average price of applications 
featured as “installed by other users”(𝛽19,3 = 0.1431), will significantly increase the total 
number of positive review counts, after controlling developer heterogeneity.  
Second, the number of applications developed by the developer (𝛼1 = −3.8470) 
and average counts of applications developed by the developer (𝛼2 = −1.2740) will 
significantly decrease positive review counts, even after controlling for developer 
heterogeneity.   
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Table III-8 Posterior means of the model on log(positive counts/downloads) 
 Lognormal regression random intercept 
random coefficient - 
uncorrelated random coefficient - correlated 
 mean 2.50% 97.50% mean 2.50% 97.50% mean 2.50% 97.50% mean 2.50% 97.50% 
𝛼1 -0.3616** -0.4536 -0.2669 -3.8470** -4.4010 -3.3370 -4.1380** -4.7260 -3.5590 -4.1740** -4.7670 -3.6110 
𝛼2 0.1500** 0.0749 0.2241 -1.2740** -1.6750 -0.8842 -1.4850** -1.9360 -1.0520 -1.4900** -1.9500 -1.0470 
𝛼3 0.3280** 0.2482 0.4076 -0.0702 -0.4938 0.3508 -0.0018 -0.4340 0.4279 -0.0307 -0.4680 0.3908 
𝛽1 -0.2540** -0.4699 -0.0363 1.0420** 0.9008 1.1890 1.1130** 0.9241 1.2980 1.1240** 0.9270 1.3170 
𝛽2 0.1081 -0.0211 0.2379 0.0963 -0.0087 0.2060 -0.0350 -0.1579 0.0914 -0.0251 -0.1538 0.1177 
𝛽3 0.0649 -0.0012 0.1305 0.0834** 0.0299 0.1409 0.0595 -0.0197 0.1407 0.0665 -0.0152 0.1410 
𝛽4 0.1107** 0.0549 0.1671 0.0898** 0.0465 0.1347 0.1347** 0.0483 0.2289 0.1382** 0.0485 0.2270 
𝛽5 -0.4185** -0.5559 -0.2799 0.0088 -0.1013 0.1227 -0.0248 -0.1623 0.1133 -0.0092 -0.1392 0.1184 
𝛽6 -0.6169** -0.8268 -0.4084 -0.0753 -0.3097 0.1546 -0.0722 -0.3775 0.2436 -0.0166 -0.3237 0.2855 
𝛽7 -0.3365** -0.5148 -0.1595 0.0203 -0.1235 0.1621 0.0481 -0.1242 0.2198 0.0680 -0.0980 0.2331 
𝛽8 -3.8380** -4.0580 -3.6190 -0.4835** -0.7367 -0.2307 -0.7306** -1.0260 -0.4386 -0.5674** -0.9110 -0.2465 
𝛽9 -4.1390** -4.3500 -3.9290 -0.5965** -0.8699 -0.3302 -0.8991** -1.2210 -0.5882 -0.7563** -1.1310 -0.4130 
𝛽10 -3.8300** -4.0460 -3.6060 -0.5880** -0.8715 -0.3139 -0.8224** -1.2240 -0.4421 -0.6502** -1.1030 -0.2705 
𝛽11 -3.9400** -4.1360 -3.7410 -0.4858** -0.7409 -0.2354 -0.7501** -1.0540 -0.4454 -0.6354** -0.9726 -0.3119 
𝛽12 -4.3570** -4.5730 -4.1400 -0.8015** -1.0690 -0.5507 -0.8796** -1.1630 -0.5880 -0.7780** -1.1170 -0.4581 
𝛽13 -4.3320** -4.5270 -4.1380 -0.7409** -1.0090 -0.4942 -0.8931** -1.1780 -0.5962 -0.7741** -1.1280 -0.4478 
𝛽14 -3.5190** -3.7230 -3.3110 -0.2174 -0.4267 0.0011 -0.2647** -0.5121 -0.0175 -0.2441 -0.5052 0.0010 
𝛽15 -0.0647** -0.1155 -0.0132 -0.0124 -0.0489 0.0220 2.7900** 2.1770 3.4340 2.3460** 1.8090 2.9100 
𝛽16 0.0830** 0.0273 0.1385 0.0437** 0.0058 0.0804 0.0263 -0.0227 0.0759 0.0286 -0.0191 0.0798 
𝛽17 0.0095 -0.0498 0.0680 -0.0272 -0.0645 0.0093 -0.0145 -0.0647 0.0333 -0.0160 -0.0636 0.0304 
𝛽18 0.1108** 0.0486 0.1737 0.0621** 0.0197 0.1052 -0.0148 -0.0754 0.0468 -0.0024 -0.0619 0.0564 
𝛽19 0.7242** 0.6255 0.8233 0.1844** 0.1167 0.2491 0.1431** 0.0636 0.2291 0.1535** 0.0710 0.2453 
𝜎 1.3450 1.3070 1.3830 0.7598 0.7371 0.7831 0.5741 0.5519 0.5961 0.5874 0.5651 0.6103 
𝜎𝜂       3.1710 2.8730 3.4960 3.2570 2.9360 3.6110 3.3210 2.9490 3.7070 
DIC   -13510   -16030   -16740   -16700 
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3.6 Conclusion 
3.6.1 A Summary of Results 
In this study, we developed models to test the effects of price on the volume of online 
consumer reviews for mobile applications. We first implement the model on the total 
volume of online WOM (model 1). Results show that free applications will significantly 
increase the volume of online WOM, which, to some extent, confirms the practitioner 
assumption that the Freemium business model will help marketers gain online WOM. 
However, our further exploration proved that this effect is spurious after considering the 
influence of the size of the user base.  
More than half of the mobile applications in the marketplace are free giveaways. 
In some cases, developers may release both free and paid versions with different 
features. Marketers of mobile applications offer free giveaways in the hope of increasing 
sales through boosting online WOM. The assumption here is that the more user bases 
that a product acquires, the more value that users perceive. This should increase the 
volume of online WOM and therefore increase acquisition of new customers. We test this 
idea in our second model by adding the variable of user base as an explanatory variable.  
However, simply treating user base as an explanatory variable cannot exclude the 
possibility that current users may attract more future users. Given the unique attributes 
of our dataset that the ratings and reviews of each application were posted by actual 
users, we empirically implement a third model. In this model, the outcome is not the 
absolute volume of online WOM. Instead, we explore what factors influence the 
probability of users posting their reviews after they actually experience the product. Our 
79 
 
 
 
results suggest that Freemium business model does not help to boost online WOM at all. 
Instead, users who adopt paid applications are most likely to express their opinions 
online. The explanation is that users downloading paid applications may put more effort 
on evaluating the potential usage value of the benefit (Wathieu and Bertini, 2007) and 
thus are more engaged in behaviors such as spreading WOM online.   
In addition to this important finding, this study reveals the influence of many other 
factors on users’ probability of posting their WOM online. First, mobile applications of 
larger file size will be more likely to be talked about. Second, number of screenshots, as 
an advertising cue, helps to boost users’ probability of posting their ratings and reviews 
online after accounting for unobserved heterogeneity of developers. Third, mobile 
applications with more mature content will less likely to stimulate users to spread their 
WOM online. Fourth, users will be more likely to talk about mobile applications with 
higher average rating after accounting for unobserved heterogeneity of developers. Fifth, 
competition from similar applications actually seems not so important after accounting 
for unobserved heterogeneity of developers. Finally, however, developers’ experience is 
important. An interesting point found in our research is that the more applications 
developed by the developer, the less likely that the focal applications to be talked about. 
In other words, public visibility in this sense does not help to simulate online WOM. But 
on the contrary, users like to talk about the applications developed by unknown 
developers, which is consistent with the idea of Hughes (2005) that unusual, outrageous, 
or remarkable things generate conversation. People love to talk about things that are 
different and surprising (Rosen, 2009; Knox 2010; Nulman, 2009).  
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Moreover, given the positive influence of average rating on volume, it is important 
to examine the key factors to generate both positive and negative volume of online WOM. 
There are many important findings. First, low average rating stimulates negative online 
WOM. On the positive side, however, higher average rating will simulate more positive 
volume of online WOM. Second, having YouTube Video will decrease the number of 
negative WOM.  
3.6.2 Managerial Implications 
The findings of the present study have important managerial implications for mobile 
applications and other digital products, such as online blogs, online videos, etc. In the 
marketplace of digital products, since online WOM has dominant influence on boosting 
user bases, it is important for marketers to stimulate users spreading their WOM in order 
to acquire more users. However, an intuitive assumption in the marketplace is that free 
giveaways may attract more users to install the applications and therefore increase online 
WOM. Our empirical results support this assumption. However, a further question faced 
by current developers is that of how to monetize their products. The findings suggest that 
free mobile applications are double-edged swords. On the one hand, they may help the 
developers gain users and increase online WOM. On the other hand, free mobile 
applications may cannibalize the market share of paid application and thus hurt the 
profitability of this product. Our research, however, shows that among those users who 
download the applications, users who actually spend money to buy the application will 
be more likely to spread WOM. To this point, although free giveaways may help to boost 
installation base, it may not necessarily create interests among users.  Users are more 
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likely to discuss apps that they actually paid for. To generate more online WOM, 
developers have to make their applications more interesting. In addition, applications 
with less mature content will help to boost online WOM. High average ratings will 
definitely increase the volume of online WOM. But the influence of average rating is 
extreme. Higher average rating will increase later on positive volume of online WOM, but 
lower average rating will increase later on negative volume of online WOM.   
3.6.3 Limitations and Future Directions 
As a new industry, in just 4 years, mobile apps have overtaken the web and are beginning 
to challenge television, the top media channel. Yet, academic research hasn’t caught up 
with this domain. In this hyper-competitive landscape with a wide range of choices, 
mobile apps consumption of mobile apps gives rise to a whole host of research areas that 
straddle both marketing and technologies. In our study, we explore the issue that what 
factors generate online WOM. However, an important mechanism which is probably a 
bigger driver of app discovery and usage is offline WOM. To understand what factors 
influence these face-to-face mechanisms are important because many consumers 
instantly download applications that their friends/acquaintances are using when this 
discovery happens face-to-face as a friend can convey why he or she likes the application 
and uses it. In addition, for apps with strong network effects, knowing what friends and 
family members are using has a greater influence on the eventual choices. Therefore, an 
important area for future research is to not only understand the varying effects of reviews 
on apps sales but also the review generation process that can determine how may reviews 
an app gets.  
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In our current study, we only account for both observed and unobserved 
heterogeneity of mobile application developers. Another type of heterogeneity may be 
even more important in terms of online WOM – the user characteristics. Users differ in 
their ability and motivations to use applications in the ways they are intended, and as a 
consequence, have varying perceptions of app features. Mobile apps developers, 
therefore, must understand the characteristics of users to improve the design and other 
features of their products.  
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IV. Customer Acquisition and Growth in Extremely Competitive 
Markets: Insights from the Mobile App Category 
 
Abstract 
In essay III, I aim to jointly analyze the customer acquisition reached and the time to get 
there using a joint ordinal-survival analysis model. The focus in this research is on why, in 
the face of such extreme competition, some apps acquire customers faster than others.   
I investigate this question using data on the number of users acquired, and the acquisition 
growth, for about 2455 Apps from Google Play. I categorize the number of users acquired 
into ordered tiers and formulate a joint model of growth and customer acquisition using 
a survival model for the former and an ordinal logit model for the later.  The explanatory 
variables include price, valence of customer rating, and other product attributes. 
Additionally, effects of competitive contexts and frames are considered.  I also consider 
the role of information cascades on customer acquisition and growth in extremely 
competitive markets.  The model is calibrated within a Bayesian framework using MCMC 
methods.  Findings for the app category as well as generalizable implications for 
extremely competitive markets are discussed.    
Key Words: Customer Acquisition; Growth; Extremely Competitive Markets; Mobile App; 
Joint Ordinal-Survival Analysis Model 
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4.1  Introduction 
Many categories today are extremely competitive due to a plethora of similar products 
being continuously offered in the markets.  For instance, mobile app users have more 
than 1.3 million available apps to choose from Google Play and 1.2 million apps on Apple’s 
app store as of July 201410.  Similarly, more than a billion subscriptions were spread across 
250, 000 unique podcasts in more than 100 languages on Apple’s iTunes Store as of July 
201311.  Individuals can also write and self-publish eBook or articles through e-book 
publishing platforms such as Amazon Kindle Direct Publishing12.  Additional examples of 
extremely competitive categories include, online microblog subscriptions (e.g., Twitter), 
online video subscriptions (e.g., YouTube), online question-and-answer services (e.g., 
Quora), and so on. The format that platforms allows anybody to launch products 
exaggerates the competition in these categories.  
Firms typically rely on three revenue models to monetize their products under the 
extreme competition.   First, a majority of firms in the markets adopt a freemium business 
strategy, offering products in the hope of expanding customer acquisition. Thus, 
advertisers may seek to promote their products through built-in advertisements in 
products in extremely competitive markets.   Second, some firms may also provide a 
version of the product with more features offered at a price while a free version can be 
                                                          
10 http://www.statista.com/statistics/276623/number-of-apps-available-in-leading-app-stores/ 
11 Trevor Mogg (July, 2013), “Apple Hits One Billion Podcast Subscriptions Via iTunes Store”, 
http://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/apple-hits-one-billion-podcast-subscriptions/ 
12 David Carnoy(2012), “How to self-publish an ebook”, http://www.cnet.com/how-to/how-to-self-
publish-an-ebook/ 
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acquired, which may bring some revenue to the company.   Third, other companies may 
adopt a base and add-on pricing strategy (Bertini, Ofek and Ariely 2009; Erat and 
Bhaskaran 2012), offering a basic version of the product for free or at a very low price, 
but charging fees for additional product features, which are referred as in-app products.  
Despite the widespread use of the three revenue models, a vast majority of businesses 
make little profits, which is especially true in mobile application market (Forbes 2013). An 
average iOS developer may earn a dime for every one of the 40,000 potential app 
downloads13. An Android developer, however, makes substantially lower revenue, with 
the average app download bringing in around 2 cents to its developer (Forbes 2013).  
Therefore, there is much work to be done to increase monetization of products in 
extremely competitive markets.  One way is to increase the unit revenue per purchase. In 
other words, businesses should either increase unit prices of the base product and add-
ons or provide a paid-version of the product for customers, i.e., by utilizing the last two 
revenue models mentioned above.   
Another way to increase revenue, giving the universally low margin in these categories, is 
to increase the customer acquisition and growth rate. The developers may, thus, make 
decent profits based on a large user base through the first revenue model, though the 
unit margin is relatively low.  The businesses, however, vary substantially in the customer 
base acquired and the time taken to reach the level of customer acquisition.    For 
                                                          
13 In the article of “How Much Do Average Apps Make?” (Forbes 2013), Tristan Louis computed the 
revenue per download based on the total downloads and thus the revenue earned in the two platforms.  
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instance, in the mobile app market, based on a sample I collected, when Rovio Mobile 
Ltd. launched a new app, “Angry Birds Star War”, on Nov 8, 2012, it quickly became a hit 
- acquired more than 10 million users in less than six months (161 days).  However, 
another product in the sample, “Neon Smoke”, which was released on Mar 6, 2012, only 
acquired more than 10 thousand users over 14 months (408 days).   
The substantial variation in customer acquisition and growth rate permits us to explore 
the question of what factors help to attract more users rapidly. The issue has not yet been 
investigated in previous literature. This is the focus of the research.   Specifically, the study 
aims to provide insights into why some apps grow faster than others regardless of what 
level they grow to.   For instance, there would be two apps which both grow to the 5000-
10,000 level but one gets there within 20 days while the other take 200 days. Likewise, in 
another case where two apps both reached the million download mark, one app would 
have reached there in 60 days while the other took 100 days.   By jointly analyzing both 
the level reached, and the time taken to get there, across these very different pairs, one 
can get overall insights regarding when apps grow rapidly.  To investigate the issue, I 
developed a conceptual framework in which both customer acquisition and growth rate 
are affected by context effects, framing effects, and information cascade effects. The data 
of 2454 mobile apps were collected for the study and a simultaneous equation model 
with joint random effects is implemented in Bayesian Paradigm by using MCMC methods.  
The research setting is the mobile app category. This is a relevant category to investigate 
for multiple reasons.  First, this is a typical market with extreme competition. As of 
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October 18, 2014, the total number of mobile apps in Android market is 1,376,761.  When 
users search for a certain type of product, the distributor will present a choice set with 
many competitive options. Therefore, businesses in the market compete for customers 
fiercely.   Second, the market grew rapidly in recent years.  According to Gartner (2013)14, 
the total number of downloads in 2012 was 63 billion, and it is projected to reach 269 
billion in 2017 – about 4.3 times.   Third, developers vary substantially in customer 
acquisition and growth rate. In the sample of over two thousand apps that I investigate, 
for instance, the customer base varied from 0 to more than 10 million and the time taken 
to reach a certain customer acquisition level varies substantially across different products.  
Finally, the product attributes, competitive context, and developers’ abilities and 
experiences vary substantially as well.  For instance, the file size, representing product 
complexity, varied from 0.001 MB to 1024 MB. The average volume of customer ratings 
for competitive products varied from 0 to 697185. The product assortment size varied 
from 5 to 67.  Such substantial variations in the product attributes, competitive context, 
and developers’ abilities and experiences and corresponding customer acquisition and 
growth rate permit us to investigate the effects of those factors on the two.  
Next I review the literature and develop the conceptual framework.   I then describe the 
data and the empirical model for the investigation.   Following this, I present the empirical 
results for the empirical investigation.  Finally, I discuss the implications of the findings 
                                                          
14 Mobile App Store Downloads, Worldwide, 2010-2016 (Millions of Downloads). Source: Gartner 
(September 2013) 
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for the customer acquisition and growth rate in extremely competitive categories and 
provide directions for additional research.  
4.2 Conceptual Framework 
In extremely competitive markets, customers start making purchase decisions by 
searching for product information through big platforms.   For instance, customers 
acquire mobile apps primarily through the five largest platforms, Google Play Store, 
Apple’s App Store, Amazon’s App Store, and Windows App Store.  The platforms provide 
information of a large number of products in a certain similar format.  Taking Google Play 
Store as an example, a search of products on the platform results in icons of hundreds of 
similar options.  An icon displays the app name, the developer’s name, and the price.   By 
clicking the icon, customers can obtain more information of the product, including 
screenshots, valence and volume of customer ratings, product description, file size in 
megabytes, content rating, customer acquisition in the form of ranges, etc.  
Additionally, distributors will display a set of competitive products on the same page in 
which four of them are apps viewed by similar users and another set of four apps are apps 
installed by the users who also installed the app being evaluated.  The app name, 
developer name, price, and volume of customer ratings used to be displayed on each icon.  
Distributors thus define the competitive context (Tversky and Simonson 1993) of each 
item in the choice set.   
Moreover, an assortment of products created by the same developer would also be 
displayed on the website. By clicking the link of “more from developer”, customers can 
93 
 
 
 
find icons of all other products created by the developer on the platform. A click on an 
icon would reveal its price, valence and volume of customer ratings, etc. The set of 
products created by the same developer, therefore, provides a frame (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1986) for each product presented in the choice set.  
In extremely competitive markets such as mobile apps, customers may rely on price to 
evaluate the alternatives and select the best option. However, faced a large number of 
similar options, customers may be susceptible to choice overload (Iyengar and Lepper 
2003) and desire to simplify the choice decisions (Dhar, Nowlis and Sherman 2000).  Thus, 
we suggest that the customer acquisition and growth rate are also subject to context 
effects (Prelec, Wernerfelt and Zettelmeyer 1997; Bertini, Wathieu and Iyengar 2012) and 
framing effects (Tversky and Kahneman 1981; Kahneman and Tversky 1986; Levin, 
Schneider and Gaeth 1998) which can help simplify the choice.   
Additionally, an increase in the number of customers may also lead to informational 
cascades (Anderson, 2001; Bikhchandani, et al., 1992; Bikhchandani, et al., 1998; Walden 
and Browne, 2002) and thus increase the growth rate.   The theoretical framework, thus, 
is based on the above four components.  
Weighted Additive Utility Model 
Facing a wide selection of similar products in extremely competitive markets, consumers 
may need to take considerable cognitive effort on evaluating the product attributes to 
find an optimal choice. To achieve the goal, we suggest that customers may rely on the 
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weighted additive utility model (Bettman, Luce and Payne 1998) to assess the utility of a 
specific product.  
There is evidence in the literature that consumers use the weighted additive-utility model 
where they evaluate the attributes of an alternative in detail in order to select the best 
option. For instance, Bettman, Luce and Payne (1998) suggest task complexity can 
influence information processing.  Specifically, as the complexity of the product increases, 
consumers are likely to resort to simpler heuristics. Swaminathan (2003) suggests 
customers are more likely to rely on recommendation agents to select the “best” option 
while product complexity is low.  In the case of products in mobile application market, a 
product with larger file size may contain more features and provides more in-app 
products for customers, and thus increase the product complexity, which may require 
more cognitive efforts.  Therefore, I suggest that a product with a high level of complexity 
may discourage customers to select it due to information overload (Jacoby 1977), and 
thus, attract less customers and decreases growth rate.  
Previous literature also suggest that product category may affect customers’ choice 
decision. For instance, Park and Lessig (1981) suggest that consumers with greater 
knowledge are better able to distinguish between attribute levels than those with lower 
levels of knowledge.  In addition, consumers with higher knowledge levels are able to 
make trade-offs between various attribute levels more easily than consumers with less 
knowledge.  Swaminathan (2003) indicates that when consumers have less category 
knowledge, to increase decision quality, consumers are more likely to rely on 
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recommendation agents.   When it comes to products in extremely competitive markets, 
knowledge of product categories becomes even more important, since the themes of 
each category vary substantively. Therefore, I also expect that knowledge of the product 
category of a product can help to attract more customers and thus increase growth rate. 
However, whether customers are familiar with a certain product category is an empirical 
results.  
Additionally, on the one hand, previous studies suggest the product price can affect the 
perceived quality of products (Gabor and Granger 1966; Dodds, Kent and Grewal 1991; 
Wathieu and Bertini 2007; Bertini, Wathieu and Iyengar 2012; Lalwani and Shavitt 2013). 
The reliance on price to assess a product’s quality or performance is particularly likely in 
extremely competitive categories (Bertini, Wathieu and Iyengar 2012). In these 
categories, most firms give their products away for free or sell at very low prices. Thus, a 
higher price may signal better product quality.  Wathieu and Bertini (2007) suggests 
higher prices in such categories could be “thought provoking and enhance the perception 
of relevance” thus increasing the likelihood of choice.  On the other hand, price also plays 
an allocative role due to budget constraints (Becker 1965, Friedman 1957) faced by 
consumers who need to allocate available monetary resources across multiple products. 
Thus, as the price of a product increases, less would be available to allocate to other 
products (Erickson and Johansson 1986) if the product is purchased. In extremely 
competitive markets, we suggest that the allocative role of app price is stronger than its 
informative role since the price is too low to signal product quality. Thus, a high product 
price is expected to decrease customer acquisition and growth rate.  
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Advertising can also affect the sales and shares of the products they sell (Tellis 1988; 
Erdem, Keane and Sun 2008).  For instance, Tellis (1998) suggests advertising exposures 
will reinforce preference for brands. Erdem, Keane and Sun (2008) also imply that both 
advertising frequency and content can signal product quality.  In extremely competitive 
categories, some developers will provide promotional videos for customers to increase 
the visibility of the product, and/or to signal better product quality (Erdem, Keane and 
Sun 2008) and reinforce preference (Tellis 1988), which would eventually increase 
customer acquisition and growth rate.  
Finally, previous studies suggest that the valence of customer ratings can affect product 
sales (Liu 2006; Dellarocas, Awad and Zhang 2005; Duan, Gu and Whinston; Hao, Li, Tan 
and Xu 2011). For instance, Liu (2006) suggests positive WOM enhances perceived value 
and thus has either a direct or an indirect recommendation for product purchase. In 
extremely competitive markets, products are a type of experience goods. It is difficult for 
customers to evaluate the true quality before actually using the product. Additionally, a 
considerable heterogeneity exists among a mixture of individual and organizational 
businesses which make it even more difficult for users to distinguish the quality of 
products ex ante (Hao, Li, Tan, and Xu 2011). Thus, the valence of customer ratings, i.e., 
average ratings, displayed by distributors, provides good source for customers to form 
initial evaluations for products and thus helps them to make final decisions. Specifically, 
we expect that the positive valence of customer ratings would encourage future users to 
purchase it and thus increase the growth rate.  
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Therefore, we suggest customers may evaluate the above attributes based on the 
weighted additive-utility model.  However, although a reliance on weighted additive 
utility model may lead to relatively better decisions, the proliferation of choice may 
demotivate the shoppers (Iyengar and Lepper 2000), who thus may desire to simply their 
choices (Dhar, Nowlis and Sherman 2000) by examining contexts and frames of the 
products.  Specifically, in extremely competitive markets, customers are expected to 
utilize the information in the context of the alternatives provided by other firms (Prelec, 
Wernerfelt and Zettelmeyer 1997; Bertini, Wathieu and Iyengar 2012). Additionally, they 
may evaluate the frames (Tversky and Kahneman 1981; Kahneman and Tversky 1986; 
Levin, Schneider and Gaeth 1998) to further assess the evaluated alternative based on 
the product assortment of a firm.  
Context Effects  
There is extensive evidence in the literature (Tversky and Simonson 1993 15 ; Prelec, 
Wernerfelt and Zettelmeyer 1997; Kivetz, Netzer and Srinivasan 2004; Sela, Berger and 
Liu 2009; Simonson 200816; Bertini, Wathieu and Iyengar 2012) that customers rely partly 
on context to evaluate alternatives. Context effects are likely to occur when consumers 
face uncertain decision environments either due to product proliferation and clutter 
(Bertini, Wathieu and Iyengar 2012) or uncertainty of product attributes (Prelec, 
Wernerfelt and Zettlrmeyer 1997; Simonson 2008).   Both conditions are likely to occur in 
                                                          
15 Tversky and Simonson (1993) define the context as “the set of options under consideration” (p.1181).  
16 Simonson (2008) refer to the preference that are context-dependent as “constructed preferences” in 
contrast to “inherent preferences”. 
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extremely competitive markets.  First, in extremely competitive markets, products being 
offered for customers have increased rapidly over the past several years. For a single 
product category, customers may find hundreds of competitive options in the markets 
when making a purchase decision.  Second, since products in these markets are 
experiential, customers lack of the knowledge to distinguish the quality of product 
attributes until they actually use them (Hao, Li, Tan, and Xu 2011). When customers face 
options that can provide very limited or no experience (Kivetz, Netzer and Srinivasan 
2004), the constructed preference based on context effects should dominate the overall 
evaluation (Simonson 2008).  I, therefore, expect context effects would play a big role in 
customer acquisition and growth in extremely competitive markets since products in 
these markets are displayed with a set of competitive options selected by the platforms 
which forms a competitive context for the product being evaluated.  
To construct the context for products in extremely competitive categories, we rely on 
average price of the competitive products to capture the influence of price in the context 
and the average volume of customer ratings to represent the popularity of products in 
the context. Two types of context effects have been widely discussed in previous 
literature. One type of context effect is the attraction effect – adding an inferior product 
to the choice set may increase the attraction of the current options.  Another 
consequence of the context is the compromise effect which leads customers to select a 
middle of the road product to avoid extremes. Both effects suggest that price and quality 
of other products can serve as important components of context for the one being 
evaluated but which effect should dominate is an empirical result. If attraction effect 
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dominates, we expect that a product with a context of lower-priced items is more likely 
to attract customer acquisitions and increase the growth rate. In addition, a product 
displayed within a context of widely discussed items are less attractive and thus decrease 
the customer acquisitions and growth rate. However, if compromise effect dominates, 
adding a high-priced and more popular item to the context will increase the acquisition 
of the product and its growth rate. 
Framing Effects 
Although context effects arise from the relative differences between an option being 
considered and other competing options available in the choice set, the past and present 
context of experience may serve as frames during a decision making process. Individuals 
tend to choose alternatives framed as gains to avoid any risks based on previous economic 
literature (Tversky and Kahneman 1981; Kahneman and Tversky 1986). The behavioral 
literature identified three types of framing effects (Levin, Schneider and Gaeth 1998): (1) 
risky choice framing based on levels of risk described; (2) Attribute framing based on some 
characteristics of an object or event; (3) Goal framing based on how is the goal of an 
action or behavior is framed.  Additionally, they find that consumers respond more 
favorably to positive frames than negative frames, since positive frames evoke favorable 
associations in memory and encourage the retrieval of positive information (Levin, 
Schneider and Gaeth 1998; Janiszewski, Silk and Cooke 2003). Similar evidence can be 
found in literature. For instance, Berger, Draganska and Simonson (2007) suggests the 
assortment demonstrates variety and indicates experience in developing similar products 
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may increase the valuation of its alternative.  Additionally, adding more options to existing 
product lines will increase the valuation of the alternative being evaluated (Bertini, Ofek 
and Ariely 2007).  
Therefore, we expect a product’s frames based on other products created by the firm may 
affect the acquisition decision and growth rate in extremely competitive categories. To 
operationalize the framing effects, we construct three variables (1) the average price of 
the products created by the developer; (2) the average volume created by the developer; 
(3) the total number of products created by the developer. First, higher average price is 
expected to provide a favorable frame due to an association of better product quality and 
thus increase customer acquisition and growth rate.  Second, higher volume of positive 
customer ratings17  can also result in associations with positive information and thus 
provide favorable frames for customers. Additionally, firms with more products may 
indicates that more resources can be provided to improve product design and implement 
effective marketing strategies, hence, serving as favorable frames.  
Information Cascades 
An informational cascade occurs when it is optimal for an individual, having observed the 
actions of those ahead of him, to follow the behavior of those individuals without regard 
to the private information (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch 1992).  The potential for 
observational learning and herding behavior arising from informational cascades has 
been discussed widely in the economic literature (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch 
                                                          
17 On Google Play Store, the competitive apps displayed have high volume of positive ratings.  
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1992; Anderson and Holt 1997; Hung and Holt 2001; Celen and Kariv 2004; Alevy, Haigh 
and List 2006; Bowden 2013). 
The effect of information cascades has also studied in two streams of marketing literature 
(Golder and Tellis 2004; Godes and Mayzlin 2004; Watts and Dodds 2007; Zhang 2009; 
Lee, Tan, and Hosanagar 2009; Zhu and Zhang 2010; Chen, Wang and Xie 2011; Godes 
and Silva 2012).  One stream of literature explored the effect of information cascades is 
consumers’ product adoption behavior (Golder and Tellis 2004; Zhang 2009). Another 
stream of marketing literature exploring the Word-of-Mouth behavior has both 
empirically and experimentally tested the influence of information cascades (Godes and 
Mayzlin 2004; Watts and Dodds 2007; Zhu and Zhang 2010; Chen, Wang and Xie 2011; 
Godes and Silva 2012).  
According to Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1998), an informational cascade are 
likely to arise because individuals obtain similar information, face similar alternatives, and 
face similar payoffs, and as a result, individuals tend to make similar choices. Thus, the 
behavior resulted from information cascade is especially likely to occur in extremely 
competitive markets due to following reasons: (1) Distributors in mobile application 
market, such as Google Play Store, provide similar information of products for customers, 
including product attributes, information of other similar products, and information of 
other products created by the same developer; (2) The competitive products existed in 
the market can be viewed as similar due to uncertainties of the product attributes and 
difficulties of evaluate all possible options; (3) Customers do not have explicit preferences 
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towards the options, the payoffs obtained from the products they bought, thus, can be 
viewed as homogeneous. Therefore, in extremely competitive markets, I expect the 
information cascade would increase growth rate. 
Additionally, in the early stage of customer acquisition, the effect of product attributes 
may outweigh information cascades effect. For instance, Golder and Tellis (2004) suggest 
that the effect of early sales of a new product could be suppressed (Golder and Tellis 1997; 
Tellis et al. 2003), only a small number of customers adopts a new product based on its 
product quality.   However, as the number of new adopters increases, it provides 
increasingly strong signal to the non-adopters, who then adopt in increasing numbers.  
Therefore, I expect that the same pattern of customer acquisition would follow in 
extremely competitive markets.  In its initial stage, a small group of customers acquire the 
products based on private information (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch 1998), i.e., 
the information of product attributes.  As the number of customer acquisition increases, 
the information derived from the decisions of others begins to outweigh an individual’s 
private evaluation. The informational cascades effects tend be more salient due to the 
convergence in actions as acquiring more customers.   
However, the cascade of customers to acquire a new product is likely to end in a certain 
stage which usually happens at the onset of maturity due to a decline of marginal benefits 
from current product and the announcement of new competitors. Thus, the growth rate 
may suffer. Therefore, in the present study, I include the categories of customer 
acquisition as indicators in the growth rate equation. I expect that a higher category of 
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customer acquisition would increase the growth rate in the early and growth stage.  
However, as the customer acquisition reaches a certain level, the growth rate would 
decline.  
4.3 Research Setting and Data Description 
I use data from the mobile app category for the empirical investigation. Most apps in the 
market are developed to be used with Google’s Android operation system, Apple’s iOS, 
or both, and are distributed through large distributors like Google Play and Apple’s App 
Store. Further, the number of apps carried by each store is very high. The Google Play 
store, for instance, had more than 30,000 apps offered for users across different product 
categories. The mobile app category is therefore extremely competitive and serves as an 
appropriate setting for this research.  
I collected the data on February 12, 2014, on all the apps available in the six categories of 
games, such as Arcade, Brain, and Cards for Google Play Store. Of the 2937 mobile 
applications that were available on that date, 483 apps were deleted either due to 
replicates or missing values. Therefore, the data of 2454 mobile apps were used for 
analysis. The mobile apps in the dataset were created by 272 developers. Hence, the data 
has a hierarchical structure. Further, a variable of primary interest in this research is the 
growth of the apps. I, therefore, identified the release date of each app in the dataset 
based on the information provided by App Annie18.  
                                                          
18 App Annie is a business intelligence company which tracks over 6,400,000 mobile applications across 
the iOS, Mac, Google Play, Amazon App Store, Windows Phone Store, and Windows 8 Store: 
http://www.appannie.com/   
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Dependent Variables: 
The two dependent variables are the customer acquisition and growth rate. For each app, 
Google Play Store provides a measure of customer acquisition in terms of the tier of total 
downloads reached. A total of twelve tiers was collected from the store. However, the 
customer acquisition is grouped into six different categories, because it would be 
computationally demanding if we implement the issue using Ordinal Logit Model with 
twelve categories, especially when there is a hierarchical structure in the model. I proxy 
the growth rate as the number of days since the launch date to the date on which I 
collected the data.  Table IV-1 provides descriptive statistics of measures of both 
customer acquisition and growth rate.  
Table IV-1 Descriptive Statistics of Customer Acquisition and Growth 
Level Number of Users 
Number of 
Apps 
% of Sample 
Average Number of Days 
to Reach the Tier 
1 0 - 500 225 9.20% 279 
2 501 - 5,000 347 14.10% 308 
3 5,001 - 50,000 589 24.00% 347 
4 50,0001 - 500,000 573 23.30% 317 
5 500,001 - 5,000,000 520 21.20% 352 
6 5,000,001 - 10,000,000+ 200 8.10% 399 
Interestingly, the tiers are not equal in size. Lower tiers have a much smaller size than the 
higher ones. This, perhaps, reflects the realization in the industry as well that early growth 
is much slower than later growth.   Second, the distribution of the number of apps at each 
level of customer acquisition follows a normal distribution. Fewer mobile apps in the store 
have extremely low or high levels of customer acquisition, i.e., downloads of 0 to 500 and 
downloads of more than 5 million. The number of users of sixty eight percent of mobile 
apps in the sample lies between 5 thousand and 5 million.     
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Third, the number of days indicates the growth rate of customer acquisition. In the initial 
release stage, an app may gain a small user group, i.e., from 0 to 500, in a relatively short 
time period. However, the growth rate of user base decreases after the initial stage. It 
takes longer time for an app to reach a higher level of customer acquisition. Interestingly, 
after the customer reached the third level, i.e., from 5,001 to 50,000, the growth 
increased. After this stage, however, the growth rate decreased again. Both the last 
column of Table IV-1 and the Figure 1 illustrate the pattern.  
Figure 1: Growth across Different Levels of Customer Acquisition 
 
Independent Variables: 
Mobile apps are heterogeneous in terms of their themes (e.g., arcade, brain, etc.), and 
the number and complexity of attributes (Wall Street Journal 2013). Such differences can 
affect how consumers choose, use, and assess products (Bettaman, Luce and Payne 1998) 
based on weighted additive-utility model. I, therefore, use multiple variables to capture 
the effects of product attributes in customer acquisition and growth rate. Specifically, I 
include the following variables: (1) App price (PRICE) – the app price ranges from $0 to 
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$17.41. I recode the price variable into a dummy variable with 0 represents “free apps” 
and 1 represents “paid apps”. There are two reasons. First, the price dispersion of 
application is small. The most expensive applications in the dataset is $17.41. Second, 
more than half of applications are offered for free (63.74%). Therefore, it’s not 
appropriate to treat the variable as continuous variable (2) The promotional video 
(VIDEO) – about one third of mobile apps in the sample has promotional video – may 
increase visibility of products and thus serving as an advertising vehicle (3) The Product 
Category - include Arcade, Brain, Cards, Casual, Sports, and Racing.  I recode it to six 
dummy variables with Sports serving as the reference category and include the dummies 
into model to control for the differences in product categories (4) Average Rating 
(USR_RATING) – represents the perceived quality from users who actually installed the 
products. The average rating is very positive with mean average rating of 4.005. 
Therefore, the perceived quality of most mobile apps in the store is very high (5) the File 
Size in megabytes (FSIZE) – represent product complexity and therefore affect customer 
acquisition and growth rate. Table IV-2 provide the descriptive statistics of products 
attributes illustrated above.  
Table IV-2 Descriptive Statistics of Product Attributes 
Variables Categories Number of Apps in the Category Percentages 
PRICE 
Free 1872 63.74% 
Paid 1065 36.26% 
VIDEO 
No  1975 67.25% 
Yes  962 32.75% 
CATEGORY 
arcade 589 20.05% 
brain 407 13.86% 
cards 455 15.49% 
casual 805 27.41% 
sports 340 11.58% 
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racing 341 11.61% 
 Minimum    1st Quartile Median   Mean    3rd Quartile Maximum    
USR_RATING 0 3.8 4.2 4.005 4.5 5 
FSIZE 0.001 2.6 7 21.175 17 1024 
For every app, Google Play also presents information on the other apps “viewed” or 
“installed” by the user. I constructed four variables from this information to 
operationalize context effects: (1) I compute the average price (VIEW_PRICE) and average 
volume of ratings (VIEW_NUSERS) of mobile apps featured as “viewed by the same user” 
on the website. (2) I also compute the average price (INSTL_PRICE) and average volume 
of ratings (INSTL_NUSERS) of mobile apps featured as “installed by the same user” on the 
website.  Table IV-3 provides descriptive statistics of the four variables representing 
context effects. The mean average price of the apps “viewed by the same user” (1.078) is 
higher than that of the apps “installed by the same user”(0.775).  In addition, the mean 
average volume of the apps “installed by the same user” (30146) is much higher than that 
of the apps “installed by the same user” (808).  
Table IV-3 Descriptive Statistics of Variables Representing Context Effects 
 Minimum    1st Quartile Median   Mean    3rd Quartile Maximum    
VIEW_PRICE 0 0.248 0.743 1.078 1.495 12.598 
VIEW_NUSERS 0 1924 7364 30146 30905 697185 
INSTL_PRICE 0 0 0 0.775 1.490 9.168 
INSTL_NUSERS 0 31 70 808 230 107572 
Finally, Google Play also gives users the opportunity to learn more about the app 
developers’ features. For every app in the sample, Google Play provides a product 
assortment created by the developer and a hyperlink to a more detailed summary screen 
which includes all apps created by the developer. I use the information to construct three 
variables to represent the influence of framing effects: (1) The total number of mobile 
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apps created by the developer (NAPPS) – represents the size of product assortment; (2) 
The average volume of ratings of mobile apps created by the developer (NUSERS) – 
represent the general popularity of the products created by the developer; (3) The 
average price of mobile apps created by the developer (AVEPRICE), which may signal the 
average product quality of the products created by the developer.  Table IV-4 provides 
descriptive statistics of the three variables representing framing effects. The developers 
exhibit substantial heterogeneity in the size of the product assortments, the average 
volume of ratings, and the average price of product assortments. I relied on these three 
variables to control developers’ fixed effects in the empirical investigation. The control of 
heterogeneity reduces the likelihood of systematic correlation between app attributes 
and developers’ experience.  
Table IV-4 Descriptive Statistics of Variables Representing Framing Effects 
 Minimum    1st Quartile Median   Mean    3rd Quartile Maximum    
NAPPS 5 7 12 17.9 22 67 
NUSERS 1 95 1037 16791 14880 381976 
AVEPRICE 0 0 0.398 0.830 1.273 10.928 
 
4.4 Modeling Approach 
Since the goal is to investigate the factors that affect the time taken by app 𝑖 (𝑡𝑖𝑘,) to 
reach category 𝑘 (𝑘𝑖) since its launch, I decide to implement the issue using a joint model 
(Henderson, Diggle, and Dobson 2000) with survival model on growth rate and ordinal 
logit model on levels of customer acquisition. The probability for each app 𝑖 taking time 𝑡 
to reach level 𝑘 of customer acquisition, therefore, is: 
𝐿𝑖𝑘 = 𝑝(𝑘𝑖)𝑝(𝑡𝑖𝑘) 
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Where, 
p(𝑘𝑖) is the density function of the ordinal logit model; 
p(𝑡𝑖𝑘) is the density function of the survival model;  
Model for Growth: Survival Model  
Since the number of days in release is the proxy for growth rate, I take a survival analysis 
approach to investigate growth rate. For each app 𝑖, I assume that the baseline density of 
the event time follow a Weibull distribution, where 𝜇1𝑖 is the scale parameter and 𝜆 is the 
shape parameter.  
𝑡𝑖𝑘|𝜆, 𝜇1𝑖~𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑙𝑙(𝜆, 𝜇1𝑖) 
𝑓(𝑡𝑖𝑘|𝜆, 𝜇1𝑖) = 𝜇1𝑖𝜆𝑡𝑖𝑘
𝜆−1𝑒−𝜇1𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑘
𝜆
 
ℎ(𝑡𝑖𝑘|𝜆, 𝜇1𝑖) = 𝜇1𝑖𝜆𝑡𝑖𝑘
𝜆−1 
The hazard rate ℎ(𝑡𝑖𝑘|𝜆, 𝜇1𝑖) indicates the probability of app 𝑖 will reach a higher level of 
customer acquisition given that they have reached the current level.    
The likelihood function of reaching a higher level given the current acquired customer 
base, therefore, is: 
p(𝑡𝑖𝑘|β, λ) =∏{𝜇1𝑖𝜆𝑡𝑖𝑘
𝜆−1𝑒−𝜇1𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑘
𝜆
}
𝑛
𝑖=1
, 𝑖 = 1,2, … ,2542 
The proportional term is: 𝜇1𝑖𝑘 = exp (𝑥1
′̅̅̅. 𝛽1̅̅ ̅ + ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑑𝑘 
𝑘−1
ℎ=1,ℎ≠𝑘 ) . The covariates 𝑥1
′  
includes product attributes, variables representing context effects, and variables 
representing framing effects. Additionally, figure 1 suggests that growth rate is affected 
by level of the customer acquisition reached. It is likely that, in turn, mobile apps that are 
growing at a faster rate attract more users in later stages. I, therefore, allow for potential 
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simultaneity between the two outcomes. Operationally, I includes the tiers reached as 
indicators (𝑑𝑘𝑖𝑗) in the growth model. Therefore, in survival model, 𝛾𝑘captures the effect 
of passing the levels lower than 𝑘 on the time taken to reach 𝑘.   
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝜇1,𝑖𝑘) = 𝛽1,1 × 𝑈𝑆𝑅_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽1,2 × 𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽1,3 × 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽1,4 × 𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽1,5 × 𝑉𝐼𝐸𝑊_𝑁𝑈𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽1,6 × 𝑉𝐼𝐸𝑊_𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽1,7
× 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐿_𝑁𝑈𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽1,8 × 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐿_𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽1,9 × 𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽1,10
× 𝐵𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽1,11 × 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽1,12 × 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽1,13 × 𝑅𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾1
× 𝑑1𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛾2 × 𝑑2𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛾3 × 𝑑3𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛾4 × 𝑑4𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛾5 × 𝑑5𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝑢1,𝑗 
𝑑𝑘: 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑝𝑝 𝑗𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙. 𝑘
= 1,2,3,4,5 
Table IV-5 Dummy Coding of Indicators d_k,k=1,2,3,4,5 
Indicator 𝑑𝑘  Dummy Coding 
𝑑1 “1” if reached level 2 of customer acquisition, “0” otherwise. 
𝑑2 “1” if reached level 3 of customer acquisition, “0” otherwise. 
𝑑3 “1” if reached level 4 of customer acquisition, “0” otherwise. 
𝑑4 “1” if reached level 5 of customer acquisition, “0” otherwise. 
𝑑5 “1” if reached level 6 of customer acquisition, “0” otherwise. 
We assume non-informative priors on all the parameters: 
𝛽1~𝑑𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚(0,0.001) 
𝜆~𝑑𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎(0.001,0.001) 
𝑑𝑘~𝑑𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚(0,0.001) 
𝛾~𝑑𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚(0,0.001) 
Model of Customer Acquisition: Ordinal Logit Model 
In the model of customer acquisition, I assume that the utility of application 𝑖  is 
represented by an unobservable latent variable 𝑈𝑖. The downloads of application 𝑖 will 
jump to a certain level on the basis of 𝑈𝑖.  
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𝑈𝑖 = 𝜇2,𝑖 + 𝜀 
The threshold parameters obey the ordering constraint: 𝜃1 < 𝜃2 < 𝜃3 < 𝜃4 < 𝜃5  
𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑠𝑖 = 1 
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑
→   𝑈𝑖 < 𝜃1 
𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑠𝑖 = 2 
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑
→   𝜃1 < 𝑈𝑖 < 𝜃2 
𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑠𝑖 = 3 
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑
→   𝜃2 < 𝑈𝑖 < 𝜃3 
𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑠𝑖 = 4 
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑
→   𝜃3 < 𝑈𝑖 < 𝜃4 
𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑠𝑖 = 5 
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑
→   𝜃4 < 𝑈𝑖 < 𝜃5 
𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑠𝑖 = 6 
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑
→   𝑈𝑖 > 𝜃5 
Assume that 𝜀 follows a logistic distribution, which means the cumulative distribution of 
𝜀 is 𝐹(𝜀) = exp (𝜀) (1 + exp(𝜀))⁄ .  
Specifically, 
      𝑝𝑖1 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑈𝑖 < 𝜃1) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜇2,𝑖 + 𝜀 < 𝜃1) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜀 < 𝜃1 − 𝜇2,𝑖) 
𝑝𝑖2 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜃1 < 𝑈𝑖 < 𝜃2) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜃1 < 𝜇2,𝑖 + 𝜀 < 𝜃2) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜃1 − 𝜇2,𝑖 < 𝜀 < 𝜃2 − 𝜇2,𝑖) 
𝑝𝑖3 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜃2 < 𝑈𝑖 < 𝜃3) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜃2 < 𝜇2,𝑖 + 𝜀 < 𝜃3) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜃2 − 𝜇2,𝑖 < 𝜀 < 𝜃3 − 𝜇2,𝑖) 
𝑝𝑖4 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜃3 < 𝑈𝑖 < 𝜃4) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜃3 < 𝜇2,𝑖 + 𝜀 < 𝜃4) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜃3 − 𝜇2,𝑖 < 𝜀 < 𝜃4 − 𝜇2,𝑖) 
𝑝𝑖5 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜃4 < 𝑈𝑖 < 𝜃5) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜃4 < 𝜇2,𝑖 + 𝜀 < 𝜃5) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜃4 − 𝜇2,𝑖 < 𝜀 < 𝜃5 − 𝜇2,𝑖) 
       𝑝𝑖6 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑈𝑖 > 𝜃5) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜇2,𝑖 + 𝜀 > 𝜃5) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜀 > 𝜃5 − 𝜇2,𝑖)       
In the ordinal logit model, similarly, the three sets of covariates representing the product 
attributes, context effects, and framing effects were included in the regression function. 
Additionally, the number of days since launch is included as a predictor in the customer 
acquisition in the model to control for simultaneity between growth rate and customer 
acquisition.  
𝜇2,𝑖 = 𝛽2,1 × 𝑈𝑆𝑅_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2,2 ×  𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2,3 × 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2,4 × 𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2,5
× 𝑉𝐼𝐸𝑊_𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2,6 × 𝑉𝐼𝐸𝑊_𝑁𝑈𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2,7 × 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐿_𝑁𝑈𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽2,8 × 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐿_𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2,9 × 𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2,10 × 𝐵𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2,11
× 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2,12 × 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2,13 × 𝑅𝐴𝐶𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2,14 × 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑗 + 𝑢2,𝑗 
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I again assume non-informative priors on all parameters: 
𝛽2~𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(0,0.001) 
The sample also suggests that the growth rate and customer acquisition can be related to 
two groups of observable variables: the application-level variables and the developer-
level variables.  For instance, a lower price of a mobile app may attract more users. 
However, products created by developers with good reputation and more resources 
might be more popular in the market. Therefore, I allow for a frailty in survival model and 
the random effects in the ordinal logit model to control for the heterogeneity of 
developers in the market. Operationally, I assume that they follow a bivariate normal 
distribution. 𝜇𝑢𝑗 capture the fixed effects of developers by regressing on three variables 
representing framing effects created by developers: (1) the total number of products (2) 
the average volume of ratings (3) and the average price.  𝛴𝑢 captures both the variances 
and covariance of growth rate and customer acquisition. Specifically, the variance of 𝑢1𝑗 
captures the random effects of developers on growth rate, whereas the variance of 𝑢2𝑗 
captures the random effects of developers on customer acquisition. Finally, the 
covariance captures the random effects of simultaneity between growth rate and 
customer acquisition. I assume non-informative priors and hyper priors on all the 
parameters.  
(
𝑢1𝑗
𝑢2𝑗
)~𝑏𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(𝜇𝑢𝑗, 𝛴𝑢) 
Priors:  
𝜇𝑢𝑗~𝑏𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(𝑚𝑛𝑢𝑗, 𝐵) 
Σ𝑢~𝑤𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅, 𝑛𝑢) 
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𝑚𝑛1,𝑗 = 𝛼1,1 × 𝑁𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑗 + 𝛼1,2 × 𝑁𝑈𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑗 + 𝛼1,3 × 𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑗 
𝑚𝑛2,𝑗 = 𝛼2,1 × 𝑁𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑗 + 𝛼2,2 × 𝑁𝑈𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑗 + 𝛼2,3 × 𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑗 
Hyper priors: 
𝛼𝑞,𝑟~𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(0,0.001) 
I calibrate the model using MCMC methods in Bayesian framework. Prior to model 
calibration, I log-transform and standardize all continuous variables in the sample due to 
skewness.   
4.5 Empirical Results 
4.5.1 Empirical Results of Growth Model 
Estimates of the parameters of the survival model are presented in Table IV-5 to Table IV-
8. The research question is on what factors affect the growth rate.  
Effects of the Weighted Additive Utility Model: 
First, as what we expected, price has a significant negative effect on hazard rate due to 
its allocative role (𝛽1,3 = −1.18). Thus, in the mobile app market, high price of products 
will reduce growth rate.  In other words, it takes longer time for a high-priced item to 
reach a higher level.  More importantly, however, product complexity has a positive effect 
thus increases hazard rate (𝛽1,4 = 0.151). Thus, a product with bigger file size will take 
shorter time to reach a higher level. Interestingly, both promotional videos and valence 
of customer ratings do not have any significantly effect on growth rate. As for the product 
categories, compared with Sports mobile apps, Arcade, Racing, and Casual mobile apps 
can increase hazard rate, whereas Cards will decrease hazard rate. Therefore, a card game 
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will take a longer time to reach a higher customer acquisition level compared to games of 
other categories.  
Table IV-6 Empirical Results of Price, Promotion and Product Attributes on Growth  
  Posterior Mean 2.5% 97.5% 
USR_RATING 𝛽1,1 -0.0411         -0.0949 0.0124 
VIDEO 𝛽1,2 0.1201 -0.0105 0.2479 
PRICE 𝛽1,3   -1.1800**  -1.4910 -0.8604 
FILE SIZE 𝛽1,4 0.1510** 0.0797 0.2259 
ARCADE 𝛽1,9 0.4115** 0.2412 0.5819 
BRAIN 𝛽1,10 0.1368 -0.0581 0.3354 
CARDS 𝛽1,11 -0.3422** -0.5957 -0.0977 
CASUAL 𝛽1,12 0.2751** 0.0965 0.4516 
RACING 𝛽1,13 0.3675** 0.1790 0.5569 
Empirical Results of Context Effects: 
Interestingly, two of the variables representing part of the effect of the context of mobile 
apps “viewed by similar users” do not have any significant effects on hazard rate.  Mobile 
apps “installed by similar users”, however, do have significantly negative effects on 
hazard rate.  Specifically, as the price of mobile apps “installed by similar users” increases, 
hazard rate decreases and thus the product being acquired will take longer time to reach 
a higher customer acquisition level, which is opposite to our expectation. The possible 
explanation is that customers may have a budget constraints on the apps that one can 
consume. Therefore, as the price the apps installed on their device increases, they are 
less likely to acquire a similar one.   Similarly, as the number of users who installed similar 
apps increases, hazard rate decreases and thus it takes longer time for the product to 
reach a higher customer acquisition level.  The possible explanation is that the 
competitive apps may have taken a considerable shares and thus decrease the rate to 
115 
 
 
 
acquire the product. Therefore, adding a high-priced and widely-discussed similar product 
to the context may hurt the growth rate, providing negative contexts for the product. 
Table IV-7 Empirical Results of Context Effects on Growth  
  Posterior mean 2.5% 97.5% 
VIEW_PRICE  𝛽1,5 0.0231    -0.0286 0.0765 
VIEW_NUSERS 𝛽1,6 0.0202 -0.0333 0.0752 
INSTL_PRICE 𝛽1,7 -0.1359** -0.2612 -0.0081 
INSTL_NUSERS 𝛽1,8 -0.2304** -0.3022 -0.1584 
Empirical Results of Framing Effects: 
Finally, the framing effects represented by the three variables of developer’s own context 
do not have any significant effects on growth rate.  Specifically, increasing the size of 
product assortment will reduce the growth rate but the effect is not significant. 
Interestingly, knowing that the other apps having more users would increase the growth 
rate and thus decrease the duration, this can probably attributed to the enhanced 
reputation of the developer. With more users using other products, a develop is more 
likely to be recognized by customers in the market and thus the reputation would be 
enhanced.  Additionally, adding a high-priced item into the product assortment will 
reduce the hazard rate and thus increase the duration, which is opposite to our 
expectation. Other products with high prices may require more resources and thus reduce 
the growth rate of the product being evaluated. 
Table IV-8 Empirical Results of Framing Effects on Growth  
  Posterior mean 2.5% 97.5% 
NAPPS 𝛼1,1 -0.0031 -0.8303 0.7680 
NUSERS 𝛼1,2 0.1336 -0.7651 1.0550 
AVEPRICE 𝛼1,3 -0.1655 -1.0630 0.6663 
Empirical Results of Information Cascade Effects: 
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We included five indicators in the survival model to represent the tiers crossed by the app 
with the first tier serving as the base.  Since each higher tier does take more days to be 
reached, hazard rate decreases as it proceeds through the tiers.  But, consistent with the 
information cascade theory, the estimates suggest that the reduction in hazard rate slows 
down, i.e., the growth rate picks up, as the customer acquisition of the product moves 
towards the higher tiers. Additionally, as we expected, the growth rate slows down after 
reaching the third level of customer acquisition, perhaps because the customer 
acquisition reached its early mature stage, which is also consistent with our expectation.  
Table IV-9 Empirical Results of Cascade Effects on Growth  
  Posterior mean 2.5% 97.5% 
d1 𝛾1 -0.8743**  -1.1150 -0.6243 
d2 𝛾2 -0.5469** -0.7056 -0.3721 
d3 𝛾3 -0.2575** -0.4182 -0.0863 
d4 𝛾4 -0.4927** -0.6691 -0.3091 
d5 𝛾5 -0.2025** -0.3925 -0.0149 
 
4.5.2 Empirical Results of Customer Acquisition Model 
Estimates of the parameters of the ordinal logit model are presented in Table IV-9 to Table 
IV-12. The research question was on what factors affect the customer acquisition.  
Effects of the Weighted Additive Utility Model 
First, as expected, increasing product visibility by providing promotional videos can 
significantly increase customer acquisition (𝛽2,2 = 0.6436). Second, increases in product 
complexity suppresses acquisition due to information overload (𝛽2,4 = −0.1205), which 
is also consistent with our expectation. Lastly, price has a significantly negative effect 
suggesting that apps have to be priced competitively to attract more users (𝛽2,3 =
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−6.195 ) since it plays a strong allocative role in extremely competitive markets.  
Additionally, the decision to allow for simultaneity is also supported – the number of days 
since launch has a significant positive effect on acquisitions (𝛽2,14 = 0.7795).  However, 
a display of product category wouldn’t help to increase customer acquisition in the case 
of extremely competitive markets. 
Table IV-10 Empirical Results of Effects of Price, Promotion, and Product Attributes on 
Customer Acquisition 
  Posterior mean val2.5pc val97.5pc 
USR_RATING 𝛽2,1 0.5369**  0.3699 0.7180 
VIDEO 𝛽2,2 0.6436**  0.4033 0.8873 
PRICE 𝛽2,3 -6.1950**  -6.8120 -5.6440 
FSIZE 𝛽2,4 -0.1205** -0.2327 -0.0072 
ARCADE 𝛽2,9 -0.0054 -1.5070 1.4720 
BRAIN 𝛽2,10 0.0075 -1.5210 1.5740 
CARDS 𝛽2,11 -0.0095 -1.5620 1.4960 
CASUAL 𝛽2,12 -0.0016 -1.5000 1.4660 
RACING 𝛽2,13 -0.0038 -1.5020 1.5080 
  DAYS 𝛽2,14 0.7795**  0.6308 0.9322 
 
Empirical Results of Context Effects: 
The average volume of customer ratings for the mobile apps “viewed by the similar users” 
has a significantly positive effect on customer acquisition (𝛽2,6 = 0.1293) and so does the 
average price of the mobile apps “viewed by similar users” (𝛽2,5 = 0.2372).   This is a 
positive context effect. Therefore, the competitive products with high price will drive 
customers away, compromise effect occurs in extremely competitive markets. In other 
words, customers are more likely to select a middle of the road product rather than a 
product with high price.  The significantly positive effect of the average volume of 
customer ratings for the competitive products indicates that customers tend to choose 
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product which are similar to the ones popular in the market but not the most popular 
ones.  
On the other hand, as the average price of similar products installed by others increases, 
the number of customer acquisitions comes down (𝛽2,7 = −0.3796), which serves as a 
negative context.  This, again, suggests that customers have a budget constraints on the 
consumptions of mobile apps. As they installed one or more mobile apps on the device 
with relatively high price, they are less likely to install a similar one. As the average volume 
of customer ratings of the similar products installed by others increase, however, the 
number of customer acquisition goes up (𝛽2,8 = 0.8319), providing a positive context. 
Therefore, users tend to download a mobile app when the similar ones installed on their 
device have higher average volume of customer ratings.  
Table IV-11 Empirical Results of Context Effects on Customer Acquisition 
  Posterior mean 2.5% 97.5% 
VIEW_PRICE  𝛽2,5 0.2372** 0.1330 0.3420 
VIEW_NUSERS 𝛽2,6 0.1293** 0.0188 0.2382 
INSTL_PRICE 𝛽2,7 -0.3796** -0.6372 -0.1131 
INSTL_NUSERS 𝛽2,8 0.8319** 0.6832 0.9833 
Empirical Results of Framing Effects: 
Turning to the framing effects, the average volume of customer ratings of other apps from 
the same developer has a significantly positive effect on customer acquisition (𝛼2,2 =
1.5480), which is consistent with our expectation.  Therefore, improving the reputation 
of other products created by the developer can provide a positive frame for the product 
being evaluated and thus help to attract more users. Additionally, adding high-priced 
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items to the product assortment will increase the attractiveness of the product being 
evaluated and thus form a positive frame as we expected, though the effect is not 
significant. Interestingly, increase the size of the product assortment will decrease the 
customer acquisition of the product and thus form a negative frame. A possible 
explanation is that providing more products for customers may reduce the resources 
allocated to each product and thus lower the product quality, which leads to less 
customer acquisitions.  
Table IV-12 Empirical Results of Framing Effects on Customer Acquisition 
  Posterior mean val2.5pc val97.5pc 
NAPPS 𝛼2,1 -0.1096 -0.6693 0.5034 
NUSERS 𝛼2,2 1.5480** 0.8543 2.2200 
AVEPRICE 𝛼2,3 0.1543 -0.4601 0.8025 
Empirical Results of Frailty and Random Effects: 
Finally, the elements in the precision matrix are significantly positive. Therefore, the 
variance across different developers affects both growth rate and customer acquisition. 
Additionally, the significant covariance between growth rate and customer acquisition 
indicates the two are conditional dependent. In other words, the growth rate is related 
to customer acquisition. The result was also confirmed by the estimates of indicators in 
the survival model and the growth rate in the ordinal logit model. Specifically, the growth 
rate will be accelerated as it gained more customers. In the meanwhile, the increased 
growth rate helps to gain more users.  
Table IV-13 Empirical Results of Frailty and Random Effects 
Precision Posterior mean val2.5pc val97.5pc 
𝜏11 0.5288 0.2842 1.0350 
𝜏12 0.7259 0.3839 1.4440 
𝜏21 0.7259 0.3839 1.4440 
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𝜏22 1.0120 0.5322 2.0350 
 
4.6 Discussion and Future Research Directions 
In extremely competitive markets, some products can attract a large number of 
customers in a very short time period but others are struggling to win customers over for 
a very long time. However, there is little research that provides insights regarding how 
firms can succeed in these categories in this regard. This is the issue that I address in this 
research. Specifically, I investigate the factors that affect the time taken by an app to 
reach a certain download category since its launch.  
I draw on an extensive research on decision making  in economics and marketing and 
develop a conceptual model based on four components in consumers’ evaluation of 
products: a weighted additive utility component (Bettman et al 1998), a component based 
on context effects (Iyengar et al 2010), a component based on framing effects (Tversky 
and Kahneman 1981; Kahneman and Tversky 1986; Levin et al 1998) component, and a 
component of information cascades (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch 1992, 1998).  
To empirically test the proposed model, I collect a sample of mobile app data from Google 
Play Store and the website of App Annie. I reply on a simultaneous equation model with 
joint random effects to explore the effects of weighted additive utility model, contexts, 
frames, and information cascades on customer acquisition and growth rate. Specifically, 
on customer acquisition, I use an ordinal logit model with duration added as a control 
variable. On growth rate, I utilize a survival model with indicators of download ranges 
included serving as the proxy of the effect of information cascades.  
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The empirical results provide important managerial implications for the marketers in 
extremely competitive categories.   First, since customers may rely on weighted additive 
utility model to evaluate products, to acquire more customers and increase growth rate, 
developers should create less complex products offering at lower price. It is also 
necessary to provide promotional video to increase visibility of the products. Maintaining 
higher valence of customer ratings will help to increase customer acquisition as well.  
Second, developers should carefully position its product against competitors in the 
market to provide a positive context for their products. Specifically, adding a group of 
high-priced and widely discussed competitive products will increase the chances of the 
product being selected and thus provides a positive frame for the product. However, 
marketers should be aware that customers have a budget constraints on the consumption 
of mobile app products. Adding a high-priced similar product may decrease the customer 
acquisition and thus growth rate. But adding a more popular product may increase 
customer acquisition but decrease the growth rate of product being evaluated.  
Overall, to increase customer acquisition and growth rate, the empirical results suggest 
that marketers should (1) provide a product line (2) encourage users to spread word of 
mouth (3) offer lower prices and (4) carefully select competitors to position against.  
One limitation of the investigation is that our data is not longitudinal and thus we 
cannot explore the effects of previous downloads on subsequent customer acquisitions 
directly, though we believe the information cascade effect on the growth rate reflects 
that a “snowball effect” would occur in an indirect way, i.e., more customers would 
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acquire the product if it has already had a large group of user base.  Another limitation is 
that our data prevent us from exploring the effects of developers’ reputation and ability 
on customer acquisition and growth rate, such as the ability of developing outstanding 
products and implement effective promotional or advertising strategies. The effects of 
average price, average volume of customer ratings, and total number of products do not 
have significantly effects on the growth rate indicates that providing low-priced items, 
gaining more word of mouth, or expand the product assortment won’t help to increase 
the growth rate. It will therefore be useful for future research to empirically investigate 
the issue.  
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